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Abstract
Near Field Communication is a short-range wireless technology based on RFID stan-
dard ISO 18092, ISO 14443 and ISO 15693. This means, it provides compatibility with
the millions of contactless smartcards and RFID scanners that already exist worldwide.
NFC is now available on the phones and this integration has resulted in a sharp rise
in its utility. An NFC-enabled cell phone acts as an RFID reader to read compatible
RFID tags (NFC tags), such as smart posters. The same cell phone can also be used
as an NFC tag storing relevant data. In this case, a cell phone transforms into a digital
wallet storing bank cards (money), vouchers, loyalties card etc., at a secure place called
‘Secure Element’. Abuse of NFC technology is also on sharp rise because of large num-
ber of users and inadequate security standards. This thesis looks at security issues of
NFC and RFID and provides mechanisms to improve the security features. NFC Fo-
rum (an association for developing NFC standards) released the signature specification
in 2010 describing rules to digitally sign the NFC tag’s contents. A part of the thesis
covers the security related issues of the signature specification. Later in the thesis, a
new specification for authenticating an NFC tag is proposed, including a framework of
its implementation in a supply chain in order to detect counterfeit products. The thesis
also includes a framework for NFC mobile wallet, where the Secure Element in the cell
phone is only used for customer authentication and the banking credentials are stored
in a cloud. At the end of the thesis, security analysis of an authentication protocol
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Executive Summary
The thesis focuses on the security related issues of Near Field Communication (NFC)
and RFID. NFC is a short range wireless communication technology based on RFID
standard 18092, ISO 14443 and ISO 15693 and compatible with the existing contactless
smart cards. NFC tags are used in a variety of applications like product identification,
smart posters, access control etc. The integration of NFC with cell phone technology
has given a new dimension to the utility of NFC. Alongside a sharp increase in the
number of its users, the abuse of this technology also poses serious challenges.
In this thesis, we focused on authentication issues in NFC and RFID. We sub-
divided authentication issues in two different categories.
1. Tag Data Authentication. This category deals with the authentication of
the data stored on an NFC or RFID tag. In most of the scenarios, NFC and
RFID tags are deployed in public places accessible to every person. For instance,
a smart poster advertising an event is displayed in an open environment where
users can touch their cell phones to the poster to access its contents. In such
scenarios, alteration in the tag’s contents poses a serious threat whereas copying
the tag contents to another tag is beneficial. A part of the thesis deals with the
mechanisms authenticating the contents of a tag and not the tag itself.
2. Tag Authentication. There are occasions where copying the contents of an
NFC tag to another tag is undesirable. For instance, a signed NFC tag is at-
tached to a medicine packet storing its chemical composition and expiry date.
Any NFC reader can read its contents and verify it using the signature. How-
ever, a counterfeit medicine and counterfeit tag with the same data will also be
authenticated. A mechanism to authenticate a tag can thwart such attacks.
Contributions
1. Our first contribution is related to the Tag Data Authentication category. The
Near Field Communication Forum was formed in 2004 to advance the use of NFC
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by developing specifications, ensuring interoperability among devices and services,
and educating the market about NFC technology1. The NFC Forum released
various technical specifications as a process of standardising NFC technology.
One of the specification, the Signature specification, is aimed at providing data
integrity and authenticity to contents of an NFC tag. However, soon after its
release, various vulnerabilities were discovered. We fixed several vulnerabilities
and suggested amendments in the signature specification. As the result, the NFC
Forum released a revised version of the signature specification in 2013. This work
was published in the 6th International Conference for Internet Technology and
Secured Transactions, 2011 [62] and in the International Journal for Information
Security Research (IJISR), 2012 [63]. The details are covered in Chapter 3.
2. Regarding the Tag Authentication category, the NFC Forum does not provide any
specification to authenticate an NFC tag. The lack of such a mechanism opens
the door to many security threats, particularly to counterfeit products when
NFC technology is used in product identification. We addressed this weakness
by proposing a specification, based on the data structure specified by the NFC
Forum, that authenticates a tag along with its data. We provided justifications
and role of the each field of the proposed specification. The main advantage
of our proposed specification is its compatibility with the existing NFC devices.
This work is published in the International Conference for Internet Technology
and Secured Transactions 2012 [64]. The details are covered in Chapter 4.
3. After proposing the specification, we designed a framework to demonstrate its
use in detecting counterfeits products in a supply chain. We proposed that if the
products are equipped with NFC tags, the counterfeit products can be identified
by authenticating the attached NFC tags. This is a customer-level framework so
a customer can identify a counterfeit product by reading the NFC tag attached to
the product with his cell phone. This work is published in the International con-
ference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST 2013) [61]. The details are covered
in Chapter 5.
4. Tag authentication is of crucial importance when a tag is registered against a
specific user or product. In such cases, the tag authentication leads to a user
or product authentication. For instance, the access control tags serve as a tool
for user authentication. We proposed two payment solutions, based on NFC,
where a customer is identified and authenticated from his mobile device. After
1http://nfc-forum.org/
14
a successful customer authentication, the money is transferred from customer’s
to shopkeeper’s account. This work is published in the International Journal
of Advanced Computer Science and Applications (IJACSA), 2013 [56] and in
the Eighth International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing, Systems,
Services and Technologies, 2014 [60]. The details are covered in Chapter 6.
5. I also participated in cryptanalysis of an ultra-lightweight authentication protocol
used for authentication of RFID tags. My contribution in this work is the Full
Disclosure Active (FDA) Attack on the authentication protocol. This attack
reveals the secret key stored in the RFID tag. This work is published in the
Journal of Applied Mathematics and Information Sciences [17]. The details are
covered in Chapter 7.
15
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Background to RFID and NFC
Technologies
This chapter provides an introduction to NFC and RFID systems. It also
provides an overview of how the NFC technology over cell phones can be
used in everyday life.
1.1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless technology that enables identifi-
cation of tags over a radio link. In recent years, RFID technology has moved from
obscurity into mainstream applications. RFID is used for identification in a wireless
manner and, unlike earlier bar-code technology, it does not require a line of sight. This
technology consists of an RFID tag attached to an object, and an RFID reader that
reads the RFID tags to identify it. Moreover, RFID tag can store additional data
(such as manufacturer details, expiry date etc.,) than the barcodes. These character-
istics make RFID a suitable technology for identification of products in supply chain,
identification of human for access control or in any other framework where identification
is of crucial importance.
RFID tags are of various types, but at the highest level, the tags are divided into
two main classes [69]:
• Active Tags
• Passive Tags
Active tags require a power source. They are either connected to a powered infras-
tructure or equipped with a battery. This not only increases their cost and size but
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also reduces their usability.
In contrast, Passive tags do not require a dedicated power source to operate. These
tags receive power from the reader in order to perform computations and transmit data.
Characteristics like low-cost, maintenance-free, small size with indefinite operational
life make them more practicable to be used for identification purpose.
Our focus is only on passive tags as the thesis covers authentication issues of such
tags. Since these tags lack an inbuilt battery, they utilize power received from the
reader.
1.2 Power for Passive RFID Tags
There are two main approaches exist to transfer power from a reader to a passive
tag [69]:
1. Electromagnetic (EM) wave capture
2. Magnetic induction
Both approaches can transfer enough power to a remote tag to compute and trans-
mit back the response. Depending upon the power up approach, the tag can be either
a Far-field or a Near-field tag.
1.2.1 Far-Field RFID Tags
The Far-field RFID tags receive power by capturing EM waves of the reader as shown
in Figure 1.1 [69]. A simple electronic circuit in the tag is used to accumulate the
energy in order to power up its electronics. The energy a tag captures is a small
fraction of the transmitted energy from the reader. The energy is so acute that the
tag is unable to transmit back the response with enough strength to reach it to the
reader; rather it back-scatters the reader’s transmission in a pattern that stores some
of its information like Tag ID etc. Generally, far-field tags operate in the ultra-high
frequency (UHF) band (such as 2.45 GHz). A typical far-field reader can successfully
interrogate tags 3m away, and some RFID companies claim their products have read
ranges of up to 6m [69].
The limited amount of power also restricts the computational capabilities of far-field
tags. These tags can only perform simple operations like XOR, bit rotations etc., but
are unable to perform heavy cryptographic computations. This results in many security
related issues in such tags. A special branch of cryptography, light-weight cryptography,
deals with the security issues of these tags but unlike conventional cryptography, this
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Figure 1.1: Far Field RFID Technology
branch yet needs to mature. Various security algorithms and protocols for light-weight
cryptography are under development [48].
We also contributed in development of authentication protocols for these tags. This
contribution is in the form of a security analysis of earlier proposed authentication
protocols. The details are described in Chapter 7.
A well-known example of far-field RFID tag is Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags
used for for product identification in supply chains [65]. We will discuss these tags in
Chapter 5.
1.2.2 Near-Field RFID Tags
In Near-field RFID tags, the power is transferred from the reader through Faraday’s
principle of magnetic induction. A reader generates alternating magnetic field in its
locality by passing a large alternating current through its coil. A tag placed inside
the alternating magnetic field will develop a voltage across the tag’s coil as shown in
Figure 1.2 [69]. This voltage is used to power the tag chip.
Near-field coupling is the most straightforward approach for implementing a pas-
sive RFID system. This is why it was the first approach taken and has resulted in
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many subsequent standards, such as ISO 18092 and 14443, and a variety of proprietary
solutions.
Alternating magnetic field in
the near-field region
Using induction for power coupling from reader to tag and






















Figure 1.2: Near Field RFID Technology
1.3 Near Field Communication
The Near-Field RFID forms the basis of Near Field Communication (NFC). NFC is
often seen as an extension to the near-field RFID. Like an ordinary reader, the NFC
devices can read RFID tags based on specific standards; but unlike RFID technology,
two NFC devices can communicate to each other in a peer-to-peer mode, or one NFC
device can act as an RFID tag and other as a reader. NFC operates at 13.56MHz
frequency band with an operational distance of less than 10 cm. Possible supported
data transfer rates are 106, 212 and 424 kbps. NFC’s bidirectional communication
ability is ideal for establishing connections with other technologies by the simplicity of
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a touch1.
NFC was developed by Philips and Sony in 2002. Many existing standards from
RFID were adopted in the NFC. The NFC base standard for the physical layer,
NFCIP-1 (Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol 1), is standardized in
ISO 18092 [36] and ECMA 340 [26]. This standard specifies the basic characteristics,
such as transfer speeds, coding, modulation schemes, frame architecture, and RF inter-
face. It also provides initialization schemes and conditions that are required to prevent
collisions during initialization. The RF layer used in the NFCIP-1 is directly inherited
from the older ISO 14443 (Proximity Contactless Cards), more specifically the Type A
protocol defined in that standard, and on Japanese JIS 6319-4 (on which Sony FeliCa
is based). Consequently, NFC devices (reader/writer mode) are compatible with ISO
14443 smart cards.
The second major standard is NFCIP-2 (ISO 21481 [37] or ECMA 352 [27]), which
defines the selection mechanism between different contactless technologies that operate
on the same frequency 13.56MHz. It is intended to be used by mobile devices that
support communication according to ISO 18092, ISO 14443, but they must also be
compatible with other contactless standards like ISO 15693.
NFC devices have to provide ISO 14443 (proximity cards, e.g. Philips Mifare),
ISO 15693 (vicinity cards) and Sonys FeliCa contactless smart card system in order
to be compatible with the main international standards for smartcard interoperabil-
ity. Hence, as a combination of smartcard and contactless interconnection technolo-
gies, NFC is compatible with today’s field proven RFID-technology. That means, it is
providing compatibility with the millions of contactless smartcards and scanners that
already exist worldwide.
In 2004 Nokia, Philips and Sony established the Near Field Communication (NFC)
Forum2 to advance the use of NFC technology by developing specifications, ensuring
interoperability among devices and services, and educating the market about NFC
technology. Some of the standards developed by the NFC Forum, of concern to our
area of research, are described in Chapter 2.
1.3.1 NFC on Cell Phones
The integration of NFC with cellular technology resulted in a sharp rise in its utility.
The leading mobile phone manufacturers like Samsung, Nokia, HTC, Sony are inte-
grating NFC in most of their devices. Notably absent among them is Apple with its
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Figure 1.3: “N-Mark” logo used to identify NFC tags and devices
the NFC World website3 and is also attached as Appendix A to the thesis.
There can be a variety of applications of NFC over cell phones. Imagine a busy
lady who leaves her house in the morning; she secures her apartment door by touching
her phone to the door knob. On her way to the train station, she purchases a coffee
by touching her phone to the payment terminal at the coffee shop. At the station, she
touches her phone to the turnstile to debit her fare from her transit account. After she
is seated on the train, she sees a poster for an upcoming concert she wants to attend.
She touches her phone to the poster to transfer the event details to her calendar and
purchase tickets. Arriving at work, she touches her phone to the door to enter the
building. On her coffee break, she buys a snack from the vending machine by touching
her phone to the payment panel. While meeting with a client, she exchanges contact
details by touching her phone to the client’s. After work, she meets a friend and shares
the details of the upcoming concert by touching her phone to her friend’s. All of these
things are possible because of the integration of NFC with cellular technology [34].
An NFC equipped cell phone can act as an RFID reader to read from or write to
a tag. Additionally, two cells phones can share data in a peer-to-peer mode or a cell
phone can act as a tag (card emulation mode) which is read by any compatible reader.
NFC architecture on a mobile phone consists of the following components [47]:
1. NFC Antenna. This is responsible for the physical connection of the cell phone
to another RF reader, NFC device or RF tag.
2. NFC Controller. This converts analog to digital or vice versa for transmission
and receiving through the NFC antenna. Additionally, it controls all processes
related to the NFC in a cell phone.
3. Secure Element. In card emulation mode, a Secure Element (SE) is used to
store sensitive data. The SE is a combination of hardware, software, interfaces
and protocols that enable secure data storage and application execution. The
3http://www.nfcworld.com/nfc-phones-list/
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cell phone equipped with SE can be used for services requiring a high level of
security such as payment application, ticketing, etc. The SE can be in a form of
removable (SIM, external memory card) or non-removable (embedded in hard-
ware) component within the cell phone, or it can be in a cloud providing all the
necessary services.
4. Host Controller. The Host Controller interacts with the NFC Controller and
in some cases, with the Secure Element as well (for instance, to top-up credit in
the Secure Element over the air).
Figure 1.4: Architecture of NFC integrated in a mobile device
A basic NFC architecture of NFC in a mobile device is illustrated in Figure 1.4 [47].
Managing the SE among various NFC stakeholders (Banks, cell phone manufactur-
ers, Mobile network operators, merchants etc.) is an arduous job because of lack of
trust and business limitations. This area of NFC is yet to mature as it lacks a standard
infrastructure to be followed by all stakeholders.
Although the primary uses of NFC are likely to be commercial, users can also pur-
chase their own tags and use them to automate certain tasks. For example, users could
mount a tag on their nightstand that sets their phone’s alarm function. Programming a
tag with your home wireless network details would allow guests to connect by touching
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their phones to the tag. Placing a tag in your car or on your keychain can switch on
the Bluetooth to pair your phone with your car’s stereo system. Tags can also be set
in a ‘toggle’ mode that will either set or revert to a group of settings on the cell phone
each time the tag is scanned.
1.3.2 Gartner Hype Cycle for NFC
Gartner Hype Cycles, a branded graphical tool developed and used by IT research and
advisory firm Gartner, provides a graphic representation of the maturity and adoption
of technologies and applications, and how they are potentially relevant to solving real
business problems and exploiting new opportunities4.
Each Hype Cycle drills down into the five key phases of a technology’s life cycle.
Figure 1.5: Gartner Hype Cycle 2013
1. Technology Trigger: A potential technology breakthrough kicks things off.
Early proof-of-concept stories and media interest trigger significant publicity. Of-
ten no usable products exist and commercial viability is unproven.
2. Peak of Inflated Expectations: Early publicity produces a number of success
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3. Trough of Disillusionment: Interest wanes as experiments and implementa-
tions fail to deliver. Producers of the technology shake out or fail. Investments
continue only if the surviving providers improve their products to the satisfaction
of early adopters.
4. Slope of Enlightenment: More instances of how the technology can benefit the
enterprise start to crystallize and become more widely understood. Second- and
third-generation products appear from technology providers. More enterprises
fund pilots; conservative companies remain cautious.
5. Plateau of Productivity: Mainstream adoption starts to take off. Criteria
for assessing provider viability are more clearly defined. The technology’s broad
market applicability and relevance are clearly paying off.
The NFC is currently (2013) in the Trough of Disillusionment phase and needs 2
to 5 years to reach the Plateau of Productivity as shown in Figure 1.5.
This implies that after a couple of years, the NFC would become a widely imple-
mented main-stream technology provided that the NFC stake holders improve their
products and standards to pull the NFC out of the Trough of Disillusionment. Well-
defined standards and well-understood applications are the key factors for the success
of the NFC technology. Since NFC will be mostly used for m-commerce, the security
is the back-bone of the NFC. However, there are still many security related issues that
need to be addressed.
1.4 Security Concerns
Being a wireless technology, the NFC suffers not only from conventional security
threats, such as eavesdropping, data insertion, data modification, man-in-the-middle
attack, DoS attack etc. [33, 47]; but also faces a new threat from another dimension:
NFC-enabled cell phones. Conventional attacks in any RFID system generally require
an observable attacking platform, such as a laptop attached to a specific hardware, or
custom-built card emulators and off-the-shelf readers. This makes the attacker suspi-
cious in public thus making the attacks arduous. But things are not the same in NFC
technology. Here, the attacker just needs an NFC-enabled cell phone as an attacking
platform to launch an attack. Unlike a laptop or a card-emulator, holding a cell phone
near to any Point of Sale terminal would be accepted by merchants and arouse less
suspicion in public. Lishoy Francis et al. demonstrated that a cell phone can be used
as a pick-pocketing tool [30]. They performed two attacks, token cloning and contact-
less skimming, using an NFC-enabled cell phone. Same researchers also performed a
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peer-to-peer relay attack using NFC-enabled cell phones [31]. They demonstrated that
a contactless card in a pocket can be read without any intimation to the person by
holding an NFC-enabled cell phone near to pocket of the person. Similarly, e-Passports
can also be read with the cell phone without any consent of its owner. The data is not
only skimmed from the contactless card or from an e-Passport to the NFC-enabled cell
phone, but also relayed to any other machine in real time.
We, at this stage, contributed in the development of security related standards of
the NFC technology to help it reach at the Plateau of Productivity. For instance,
we highlighted some vulnerabilities in the Signature Specification, a guideline used
to digitally sign the contents of an NFC tag. We also suggested some improvements
in the Signature Specification and submitted our suggestions to the NFC Forum, an
organization responsible for the standardisation of the NFC technology. This resulted
in a revised signature specification (more details in Chapter 2 and 3).
We also realized that the NFC Forum does not provide any specification to auth-
enticate an NFC tag. We proposed a new specification for this purpose and provided
a framework to implement the proposed specification in a supply chain to detect coun-
terfeit products (Refer Chapters 4 and 5).
Keeping in view the likely use of NFC to be commercial, we also proposed a secure
mobile payment solution described in Chapter 6.
Authentication of lightweight RFID tags is a challenging task as the these tags are
unable to perform standard cryptographic functions. We analyzed a mutual authentic-





This chapter provides information about the NFC Forum and two of its
most important specifications: The NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF)
and the Signature Record Type Definition.
2.1 Introduction
The Near Field Communication Forum was formed in 2004 to advance the use of Near
Field Communication technology by developing specifications, ensuring interoperability
among devices and services, and educating the market about NFC technology1. Man-
ufacturers, applications developers, financial services institutions, and more all work
together to promote the use of NFC technology in consumer electronics, mobile devices,
and PCs. The NFC Forum promotes sharing, pairing, and transactions between NFC
devices or tags. The goals of the NFC Forum are:
• Develop standards-based Near Field Communication specifications that define a
modular architecture and interoperability parameters for NFC devices and pro-
tocols.
• Encourage the development of products using NFC Forum specifications.
• Work to ensure that products claiming NFC capabilities comply with NFC Forum
specifications.
• Educate consumers and enterprises globally about NFC.
In June 2006, the Forum formally outlined the architecture for NFC technology. The
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map that enables all interested parties to create powerful new consumer-driven and
developer-driven products. These specifications can be viewed at the NFC Forum web-
site.
2.2 NFC Forum Tags
NFC Tags are integrated circuits storing data that can be read by NFC-enabled devices.
In order to maintain the interoperability of NFC devices and tags, the NFC Forum has
specified four different types of tag [51]:
• Types 1 & 2: These tags are read and re-write capable. Users can configure
the tag to become read-only. Memory availability is 48 or 96 bytes, expandable
to 2 KB.
• Type 3: These tags are based on the Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS) X
6319-4 known as FeliCa. They are pre-configured at manufacture to be either
read and rewritable, or read-only. Their memory has a theoretical limit of 1 MB
per service.
• Type 4: These tags are pre-configured at manufacture to be either read and re-
writable, or read-only. There is up to 32 KBytes of memory available per service.
The Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) based on ISO/IEC 7816-4 is used
for communication between tag and reader.
2.3 NFC Forum Specifications
Considering the security aspect of NFC technology, we will discuss following two spec-
ifications, out of 16, in details in this chapter.
1. NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) Technical Specification. It speci-
fies a common data format for NFC Forum-compliant devices and NFC Forum-
compliant tags.
2. NFC Signature Record Type Definition (RTD) Technical Specification.
The signature record provides the integrity and authenticity to an NDEF message
by digitally signing its contents. The signature record specifies the format used
when signing single or multiple NDEF records. It defines the structure of the
signature record, provides a list of suitable signature and hashing algorithms,
and certificate types that can be used to create the signature.
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2.3.1 NFC Data Exchange Format
The NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) defines a common format and rules to ex-
change information in the NFC environment. The NFC Forum released NDEF Version
1.0 in July, 2006. It defines the NDEF data structure format as well as rules to con-
struct a valid NDEF message as an ordered and unbroken collection of NDEF records.
NDEF is a lightweight, binary message format that can be used to encapsulate one
or more application-defined payloads of arbitrary type and size into a single message
construct. Each payload is described by a type, its length, and an optional identifier.
A record is the unit for carrying the payload within an NDEF message. An NDEF
message contains one or more NDEF records as shown in Figure 2.1.
 NDEF Message 
R1, MB=1 … Rr … Rs … Rt, ME=1 
Figure 2.1: An NDEF message with a set of records R1 to Rt
The structure of an NDEF record is shown in Figure 2.2. Each row represents a
single byte.
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Type Length 
Payload Length 3 
Payload Length 2 
Payload Length 1 
Payload Length 0 





Figure 2.2: NDEF Record Layout
NDEF Header
NDEF Header is the first byte of an NDEF record. Message Begin (MB) and Message
End (ME) flags mark the first and the last record of an NDEF message respectively.
The Chunk Flag (CF) bit specifies that the payload of that record is continued in the
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next record. Short Record (SR) is a 1-bit flag which, if set, indicates that the size
of the Payload-Length field is one byte. In this case, the payload size is restricted to
between 0 and 255 bytes. Otherwise, the Payload-Length field consists of 4 bytes (as
shown in Figure 2.2) and the Payload size ranges from 0 to 232−1 bytes. The flag IL
determines whether or not the optional ID field and corresponding ID-Length field are
present.
The Type Name Format (TNF) is a 3-bit field indicating the structure of the Type
field. Its value ranges between 0 and 7 as shown in Table 2.1.
TNF Description
0 The record is empty and there is no payload or type associated with this
record. The corresponding length fields are set to zero. This TNF value
can be used whenever an empty record is needed.
1 Indicates that the Type field contains a value that follows the RTD
type name format defined in the NFC Forum RTD specification, such
as Smart poster RTD, Signature RTD, URL RTD etc.
2 Type is a MIME media type identifier (RFC 2406).
3 Type is an absolute URI (RFC 3986).
4 Type is an NFC Forum external type.
5 Type is of unknown format. It is used when the type of the payload
is unknown. When used, the Type-Length field must be zero and thus
the Type field is omitted. In this case, the payload is stored but not
processed.
6 The record continues the payload of the preceding chunked record.
When used, the Type-Length field must be zero and thus the Type
field is omitted.
7 Reserved for future use.
Table 2.1: Type Name Format (TNF) Description
Type-Length and ID-Length are unsigned 8-bit integers that specify the length
in octets of the Type field and ID field respectively.
Payload-Length field is an unsigned integer that specifies the length in octets of
the Payload field. The size of the Payload-Length field is 4 bytes when the SR flag is
clear, and otherwise the size is 1 byte. By providing the payload length within the first
few bytes of a record, efficient record boundary detection is possible.
The Type field describes the type of the payload. NDEF supports URIs, MIME
media type constructs, and NFC-specific type formats as the type identifiers. By
indicating the type of a payload, it is possible to dispatch the payload to the appropriate
user application.
The ID field is an optional identifier in the form of an absolute or relative URI.
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The use of an identifier enables payloads that support URI linking technologies to
cross-reference other payloads.
Record Chunks
A record chunk carries a chunk of a payload. It can be used to partition dynamically
generated contents or very large entities into multiple subsequent record chunks within
an NDEF message. Every chunk payload in encoded as an initial record chunk followed
by zero or more middle record chunks and finally terminated by a terminating record
chunk [3].
The initial record chunk has its CF flag set. The Type field and the ID field (if
present) indicate the type and ID of the entire payload respectively. The payload-length
field indicates the size of payload of the initial record only.
The middle and terminating record chunks do not have Type and ID fields as these
are already indicated in the initial chunk. Their TNF field value is 6, indicating that
the Type and ID are the same as for the initial record chunk. Their Type-length
and ID-length fields are zero. The CF is set for middle chunks and is clear for the
terminating chunk.
A chunked payload is entirely encapsulated within a single NDEF message. As a
consequence, neither an initial nor a middle record chunk can have the ME flag set.
2.3.2 Signature Record Type Definition
With the increasing number of available applications of NFC technology, threats of
its abuse also emerged in parallel. Lack of any mechanism to provide data integrity
to NDEF messages paved the way to exploit NDEF messages. A soft target for such
attacks is the NFC tag, a chip storing data that can be read in a wireless manner by an
NFC reader. NFC tags are generally deployed in open environment, like smart posters,
where they are subject to physical attacks like data alteration or tag replacement.
Smart posters contain information such as Title, SMS, and a URL or electronic business
card. The user can access this information by simply touching the cell phone on such
tags. Apart from displaying the information to the user, the smart poster can also
trigger an action such as opening a specific website, calling the telephone number
stored in the poster etc [4]. An attacker may replace the URL address or the telephone
number in a smart poster with malicious content. Eventually, the reader is diverted to
malicious contents as the former has no mean to ascertain the integrity of the message.
To address such issues, the NFC Forum developed the Signature Record Type
Definition Version 1.0 in 2010 [7]. The main objective of the signature RTD is to
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digitally sign the data of an NDEF message thus providing integrity and authenticity.
The signature is applied to a selection of the data of an NDEF message, and not to the
whole NDEF message. Soon after its release, various attacks were launched because of
the ‘partially signed ’ NDEF messages. We provided countermeasures to those attacks
by adding more, but not all, fields to the signature (explained in Chapter 3) and
communicated our recommendations to the NFC Forum. Consequently, the signature
specification in under revision and the candidate specification of its upgraded version,
V2.0, has been released in April 2013 for feedback and comments [9]. The major
difference in the version 2.0 is that the signature is applied to all fields as compared to
a selection of fields in the previous version. Although inclusion of all fields makes the
signature specification more secure, it results in implementations issues. These issues
are discussed in Chapter 3, §3.5. Table 2.2 compares the fields that are included in
signature in the V1.0 and the V2.0. The version 2.0 is yet to be finalized.
Since the V1.0 is still valid and our work is related to the same version, we will
refer to the same version throughout our thesis unless mentioned otherwise.
Structure of the Signature Record
The Signature Record is structured according to the format of an NDEF record shown
in Figure 2.2. The MB, ME, CF, SR and IL flags of the Signature Record are set/unset
according to the requirements. The 3-bit TNF value is 001 indicating that the record
follows the RTD type name format defined in the NFC Forum RTD specification as
mentioned in Table 2.1. The value of the Type-Length field is 0x3 indicating the Type
field consists of three bytes (0x53, 0x69, 0x67) corresponding to the word “Sig”.
Payload of the signature record stores the signature and corresponding certificates.
The contents of the payload of a signature record consist of three parts: Version, Sig-
nature and Certificate chain as shown in Figure 2.3. The Version is a single byte field
indicating the version of the specification to which a signature is compliant. The Sig-
nature field contains either the actual signature or a URI reference to a signature. The
signature RTD supports RSA, DSA and ECDSA. The Certificate Chain contains the
certificate format, the total number of certificates, the list of certificates and an optional
URI reference. The Certificate Store sub-field of the Certificate Chain does not contain
the top-most certificate in the certificate hierarchy (e.g., the root Certificate Authority
(CA) certificate in an X.509 certificate chain). Since certificate validation requires that
the top-most certificate in the certificate hierarchy be distributed independently, this
specification omits the top-most certificate, under the assumption that the NFC Forum
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Device must already possess it in order to validate the chain.
NDEF Header 
MB=0, ME=1, TNF=001 




















Figure 2.3: Structure of NDEF Signature record
Use of the Signature Record
The Signature record is applied to all preceding records, starting either from the first
record of the NDEF message or from the first record following the preceding Signature
Record as shown in Figure 2.4. In that figure, Signature Record 1 signs Records 1
and 2. It also marks the start of the signature of Record 3. Signature Record 2 signs
Record 3 only whereas Record 4 is not signed. The signature is applied to the Type,
ID (if present) and Payload of these records. Table 2.2 describes the fields of a record
that are included or excluded from the signature. The Signature Record itself is not
signed.
Field Name V 1.0 V 2.0
Message Begin (MB) Not signed Signed
Message End (ME) Not signed Signed
Chunk Flag (CF) Not signed Signed
Short Record (SR) Flag Not signed Signed
ID-Length (IL) Present Flag Not signed Signed
Type Name Format (TNF) Not signed Signed
Type-Length Not signed Signed
Payload-Length Not signed Signed




Table 2.2: Comparison of Signature Record V1.0 and 2.0
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Figure 2.4: An NDEF message consisting of multiple records.
MB flag is intentionally unsigned so that a group of signed NDEF records may be
moved to any position within an NDEF message [59]. This enables a variety of messages
to be constructed for different target viewers around an important core content which
is signed. However, it is unnecessary to sign the ME flag as the end of the section
of the message which needs to have its integrity secured is marked by the signature
record, so all the records preceding the signature record will have ME = 0.
A principle requirement of the signature definition is to be able to partition an
NDEF record into multiple record chunks or vice versa as shown in Figure 2.5 without
affecting the validity of the signature. This means, in particular, that only the Payload
is to be included in the signature for records after the first chunk. Since the signature
record is applied to Type, ID and Payload of a record, is provides a way to fulfill this
requirement as the non-initial chunks do not have Type and ID fields as described in
§ 2.3.1.
NDEF Record Signature Record 
Signature Record Chunk 1 Chunk 2 Chunk n … 
Figure 2.5: Record chunks with digital signature
Thus, the signature record does not provide integrity protection to all fields of a
record, but to a selection of fields. The ‘partially signed’ NDEF records were later
exploited and multiple attacks were launched on the signature record. The details of
such attacks will be discussed in the next chapter.
2.4 Summary
This chapter provides details about NFC Forum and two of its most important spec-
ifications; NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) specification and Signature Record
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specification. NDEF defines a common format to exchange information between NFC
Forum devices and NFC Forum tags. The signature record provides integrity and
authenticity to the data exchanged by NDEF messages. It achieves this by digitally
signing NDEF messages. It also provides rules to sign and store the signature in the
form of an NDEF record.
The signature is computed over Type, ID (if present) and Payload as described
in §2.3.2. The partially signed NDEF record can lead to various attacks. The next






Attacks on NDEF Specification
This chapter contains some attacks on the NDEF signature specification
and some countermeasures to such attacks.
3.1 Introduction
The Signature specification released by the NFC Forum is aimed at providing data
integrity and authenticity to NDEF messages. It achieves this goal by adding a digital
signature and corresponding certificates to the NDEF message. The signature spec-
ification, however, does not provide data integrity to all fields of an NDEF message
as discussed in the previous chapter. The ‘partially signed’ messages are vulnerable
to multiple attacks such as Record Composition Attack and Record Decomposition
Attack. These attacks were highlighted by M. Roland in 2011, soon after the release
of the signature specification [50].
The Record Composition Attack is aimed at composing different records in such a
way that the digital signature remains valid. There are two scenarios described by M.
Roland to accomplish this attack.
In the first scenario, two different NDEF messages are selected in which every record
has its own signature. A malicious NDEF message can be created by selecting only a
few of the records along with their signatures from the first NDEF message and other
records along with their signatures from the second NDEF message. Similarly, many
unrelated records along with their respective signatures can be combined together into
a single NDEF message. The combined NDEF message will consist of a sequence of
records that may be totally meaningless or convey misleading information, but still
have valid signatures covering the whole message.
In the second scenario, the Record Composition Attack is accomplished by combin-
38
3.2. The Amended Record Composition Attack 3. Attacks on NDEF Specification
ing and hiding selected records from different NDEF messages. An adversary takes two
or more NDEF messages signed by the same or different parties. Each NDEF message
consists of records of various types like Text, URI etc. followed by the signature. The
attacker takes all records from the NDEF messages and combines them to form a new
NDEF message. The new NDEF message will have valid signature records correspond-
ing to data from each parent tag. The attacker then effectively removes the unwanted
records from the message by hiding them from the viewer, but keeps the signatures
valid.
As all the records are digitally signed, the actual removal of any record invalidates
the signature. Instead, the chosen records are retained but hidden from the user by
manipulating the unsigned TNF field. The TNF value is changed from 1 to 5, i.e.
from the NFC Forum well-known Type to an Unknown Type. The TNF value can be
changed as it is not signed. The NDEF parser receiving an NDEF record with a TNF
value of Unknown will store the payload of that record without processing it. In this
case the payload will not appear to the user. So, rather than removing a record, it has
been hidden simply by changing the TNF value.
In fact, Roland’s attack [50] described thus far does not necessarily work because
there are a few other changes that may have to be carried out in order to keep the
signature valid. These necessary modifications were overlooked in [50]. Later, we
highlighted those modifications in [62, 63]. We amended these attacks and described
in detail the modifications that need to be carried.
3.1.1 Our Contribution
We amended the Record Composition Attack by highlighting some necessary revi-
sions in the lengths fields that were initially overlooked in Roland’s attack [50]. These
amendments are described in §3.2. Our main contribution is the countermeasures we
proposed to avoid Record Composition / Decomposition attacks. These countermea-
sures are described in §3.4.1 and §3.4.2 of this chapter. We not only published this work
at international forums [63, 62], but also approached the NFC Forum to apprise them
about the vulnerabilities in the signature specification and its fixes. Consequently, the
NFC Forum amended the signature specification and released an updated version [9].
3.2 The Amended Record Composition Attack
For the new TNF=5 of the hidden records, the Type-Length field must be zero and
there can be no Type field (see Table 2.1). This is not the case for the original record
(TNF 6= 0, 6). As the Type-Length field is not signed it can indeed be changed to zero,
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but the Type and ID fields are digitally signed and omitting or altering these fields to
maintain a meaningful payload may invalidate the signature. Specifically, in order for
the signature to remain valid, the original signature on the string Type||ID||Payload
has to be the same as the signature on the new string ID′||Payload′. These strings must
therefore be identical, with its initial interpretation replaced by one with a different,
possibly invalid ID′ and a new, probably meaningless, message Payload′. Quite apart
from the semantic issues, the signature verification now fails unless the number of
signed bytes is the same:
(Type-Length)+(ID-Length)+(Payload-Length) = (ID-Length′)+(Payload-Length′)
Therefore, apart from changing the TNF value, some further manipulation of the
NDEF header may be required, together with adjustments to the Type-, Payload-
and ID- lengths and corresponding removal, addition or repartitioning of bytes in the
corresponding three fields.
When the IL bit is set, one easy solution is to increment the original value of the
ID-Length or Payload-Length field by Type-Length. This corresponds to a re-location
of some of the signed bytes to the ID and Payload fields. When the IL flag is zero
this still works providing it is the Payload-Length field which is incremented by Type-
Length as mentioned in [59] §V(L). It works well when the ID field is not present, as
shown in Figure 3.1, but in the presence of an ID field it results in a new and probably
invalid ID′ field that may be detected by a semantic check. No bytes need removing or
adding to the record in these cases.
MB ME CF SR IL=0 TNF=1 
Type Length=2 
Payload Length=7 
Type (2 Bytes) 
Payload (7 Bytes) 
Type Length=0 
Payload Length=9 
Payload (9 Bytes) 
MB ME CF SR IL=0 TNF=5 
Figure 3.1: Example changes in the NDEF header when the ID field is absent.
We propose another solution, which cannot be caught by a semantic check on either
the type field or the ID field. Since it has no type, the Payload cannot fail a semantic
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check either. First set the IL flag to zero if it is not already zero, and remove the
bytes containing the ID-Length, as in Figure 3.2. Then increment Payload-Length by
(Type-Length)+(ID-Length), so that the new Payload consists of the concatenation
of all the bytes formerly in the Type, ID and Payload fields. In this case, Payload′
consists of all the signed bytes.
MB ME CF SR IL=1 TNF=1 
Type Length=2 
Payload Length=7 
Type (2 Bytes) 
Payload (7 Bytes) 
Type Length=0 
Payload Length=11 
Payload (11 Bytes) 
MB ME CF SR IL=0 TNF=5 
ID Length=2 
ID (2 Bytes) 
Figure 3.2: Example changes in the NDEF header when the ID field is present.
3.3 Record Decomposition Attack
In the second attack described by Roland et al. in [50], the payload is split (but not
chunked) in two parts and spread over two records. The second part is hidden by using
a record of Unknown type, i.e. TNF=5. Since Payload-Length is an unsigned field, it
can be changed in the first record without detection. The signature is computed over
the concatenated bytes from the Type, ID and Payload of all records being signed.
So, for the two new records to generate the same signature, it just requires the second
record to have no Type or ID fields. The unknown type does this job as a record with
an unknown type has no Type or ID fields. The only thing required to accomplish this
attack is the suitable completion of the NDEF header fields of the new unknown-type
record.
An example of such an attack is the text of a smart poster stating, “Do not board
the train until you have a valid ticket”. This text is digitally signed and the signature is
stored using the Signature RTD. An attacker may split this message into two separate
records as above. The first record stating “Do not board the train” will be visible to the
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user, whereas the second record stating “until you have a valid ticket” will not appear
to the user as it is sent with the NDEF header fields stating unknown type. However,
the digital signature will remain valid and so the user will consider it as a valid message.
This attack of Roland works in its original form without further modification of length
fields such as those described in the previous attack.
3.4 Countermeasures
Roland proposed that the receiver should only trust the payload bytes from a sequence
of records if they are signed and share a common signature record [50]. But this needs
very careful interpretation. As shown in the example of the Record Decomposition
Attack in §3.3, the records share a common signature but only part of the message
payload is displayed to the user. This partially displayed message with a valid signature
cannot be trusted. Hence, the user’s view of the message cannot be trusted even if all
its records share a common signature.
The easiest way to avoid these attacks would be to sign all the header fields so
that they may not be altered, but in practice this is out of the question. For example,
the MB flag is intentionally unsigned so that a group of signed NDEF records may be
moved to any position within an NDEF message [59]. This enables a variety of messages
to be constructed for different target viewers around an important core content which
is signed. However, it is unnecessary to sign the ME flag as the end of the section of the
message which needs to have its integrity secured is marked by the signature record,
so all the records preceding the signature record will have ME = 0.
A principle requirement of the signature definition is to be able to partition an
NDEF record into multiple record chunks or vice versa as shown in Figure 2.5 without
affecting the validity of the signature. This means, in particular, that only the Payload
can be included in the signature for records after the first chunk, and that the chunk
flag CF must be omitted from any header data that is included in the signature. The
inclusion of any other field from the non-initial chunks, such as length fields, TNF or
CF in the signature would also invalidate the signature. The fields from the initial
chunk which are independent of whether or not the record is chunked are the only ones
which could be included in the signature. They are the MB, IL and TNF fields in the
header byte, the Type-Length and Type fields, and the ID-Length and ID fields.
However, one could sum the payload lengths from each chunk to obtain the same
payload length as in the unchunked record, and include that in the signature because
it is unaffected by chunking. This needs to be done with care as it should be possible
to compute the signature using a block by block hash function without having to store
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every chunk payload. The message digest and total payload length must therefore be
computed in parallel and, once the last chunk has been read, the length appended as a
suffix to the string to being hashed. The resulting MAC is then signed and, if necessary,
validated.
Another principle which we may wish to respect in proposing any revision of spec-
ifications is to insist that the signature is computed on the same components of each
record irrespective of chunking. This would slightly simplify validation code, as would
omitting the payload length computation.
The last principle worth mentioning is the desire to compute signatures directly
from the concatenated record bytes in the order they appear and without alteration.
It is easy to observe that the attacks above would not work if, for example, an extra
byte B of fixed value were inserted between the Type, ID and Payload strings when
necessary to separate them before the signature is computed. Thus, when none of the
three components were the empty string, this would mean computing the signature of
the string Type‖B‖ID‖B‖Payload, but it would be computed on just Payload when
both Type and ID were of length 0. If this were done, the chunking process would
not disturb the calculation of a signature, but the re-partitioning of bytes required
in the Record Composition attack would not work. This particular solution becomes
unnecessary if the lengths of the various data components are also signed.
Based on these principles, we proposed two countermeasures [62, 63].
3.4.1 Countermeasure I
This countermeasure is based on some modifications to the signature specification1.
The signature is presently computed over Type, ID and Payload fields according to
the signature RTD V1.0, as recalled in § 2.3.2. Because of the Record Composition /
Decomposition attacks, the inclusion of additional fields is necessary. However, in order
to preserve the validity of signatures when a record is chunked, a different signature
process is required for non-initial chunks. The proposed modified signature is compared
to the existing specification in Table 3.1.
The first byte of the NDEF header containing MB, ME, CF, SR, IL, TNF cannot
be added in full to the signature as noted earlier. However, making the TNF value
immutable is wise. Its updating was the source of problems in the Record Composition
attack. So, part of the countermeasure is to sign this for all records except the non-
initial chunks. For TNF 6= 6, create a byte TNFB by masking the non-TNF bits from
the first byte of the record. This byte will be signed. TNFB will be the empty string
for TNF=6, and so not alter the signature when a record is chunked.
1Contributed by Colin Walter
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Field Name Existing Proposed
Message Begin (MB) Not signed Not signed
Message End (ME) Not signed Not signed
Chunk Flag (CF) Not signed Not signed
Short Record (SR) Flag Not signed Not signed
ID-Length (IL) Present Flag Not signed Not signed
Type Name Format (TNF) Not signed Signed (Unless TNF=6)
Type-Length Not signed Signed (Unless TNF=6)
Payload-Length Not signed Signed (Unless TNF=6)




Table 3.1: Signing an NDEF Record
Next, we propose adding the Type-Length and ID-Length fields to the existing fields
for signing except in the case of non-initial chunks, i.e. records with TNF = 6, when
they are to be omitted. Addition of these two fields to the signature process does not
invalidate the signature under the chunking process.
As noted before, Payload-Length cannot be signed unless the length is accumulated
over all chunks. Let Total-Payload-Length denote the sum of Payload-Lengths over
all chunks of a chunked record, and the normal Payload-Length for an unchunked
record. For convenience, let us define Total-Payload similarly: it is the usual Payload
for an unchunked record and the concatenation of the Payloads from all chunks of a
chunked record. This means that Total-Payload-Length and Total-Payload are simply
the Payload-Length and Payload of the corresponding unchunked record.
In our revised signature specification, the contribution to the signature of all chunks
from a chunked record is the following string:
TNFB‖Type-Length‖ID-Length‖Type‖ID‖
Total-Payload‖Total-Payload-Length
The TNFB, Type and ID contributions and their lengths are, of course, those given
in the initial chunk. The contribution of an unchunked record is the same, but can be
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Because of our definitions of Total-Payload and Total-Payload-Length, the contri-
butions to the signature are the same for an unchunked record and a chunked version of
the same record. This means that the new signature could be simply defined in terms
of the concatenated contributions from records in the equivalent unchunked message.
Note, finally, the ambiguity in the string used for Total-Payload-Length. This could
be up to four bytes, and we do not know if the original unchunked record used one or
four bytes if this length is under 28. A formal specification would have to determine
how it should be given, e.g. the endianness at bit and byte level using four bytes or
using the minimum number of bytes.
Suitability for the Record Chunking Process
The proposed signature scheme can be successfully used for validating messages with
many record chunks without the need to store payload data. The first half of the
contribution from a chunked record, namely
TNFB‖Type-Length‖ID-Length‖Type‖ID
is wholly derived from the initial chunk. Thereafter the string for hashing is given by
appending the chunk Payloads until Total-Payload has been appended. At the same
time, a record is kept of the sum of the Payload-Lengths of the chunks. When the last
chunk has been received, this sum equals the required Total-Payload-Length, and so
its value can be appended also.
Therefore, a record may be partitioned into multiple chunks or vice versa without
affecting the validity of the signature or the ease with which the signature is computed
Counter to the Record Composition Attack
The main reason for the success of the Record Composition Attack was the unsigned
NDEF header fields that could be manipulated in a specific way to accomplish this
attack (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In our proposed structure, the TNF, Type-Length,
Payload-Length and ID-Length fields are signed in addition to the already signed Type,
ID, and Payload fields. So these fields can no longer be manipulated in the required
way. This makes Record Composition Attack impossible.
Specifically, in the terminology of § 3.2, for the same attack to be successful under
the new signature scheme would require at least Type-Length = Type-Length’ = 0
and ID-Length = ID-Length’ as these both fields are signed and cannot be changed.
However, Type-Length = 0 cannot occur when TNF is other than 0, 5 or 6. Although
the original attack had an initial TNF=1 being changed to TNF=5, we should consider
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the possibility of attacks with these other initial values in order to justify (or not) the
inclusion of TNFB in the proposed signature. This is done next.
For TNF=0 the record should be empty. In this case the Payload is the empty
string and making it invisible will not make any difference to what the user reads.
For TNF=5, an update to TNF=5 also makes no difference to the message. Finally,
TNF=6 indicates that the record is a non-initial chunk. Changing the field to have
the value 5 would change it to a non-chunked record and result in the inclusion of
additional Type-Length and ID-Length fields. Although the ID-Length field is optional
in a record, the Type-Length field is not. It contributes 1 byte in the new signature
scheme, resulting in a different signature if TNF is changed from 6 to 5. We conclude
that, whatever the initial value of TNF, updating it to 5 invalidates the signature under
the proposed scheme just by virtue of including the Type-Length and ID-Length fields,
no matter how the other fields are changed.
Of course, the user needs to be aware of where signed messages start and finish
since any signed messages might be combined without change into a larger misleading
or wrong message. The signature specification clearly defines the starting and finishing
point of the data to be signed. It is up to the user’s browser and security policy to
make clear where signed messages begin and end. Ideally, it should show a single signed
message at a time and indicate that the visible message is signed with nothing hidden.
Counter to the Record Decomposition Attack
In this attack, a record payload is decomposed into multiple parts which are completed
to full (unchunked) records by the addition of relevant header fields. The TNF value
for some parts is set to 5, making them inactive records. The header fields also contain
a Type-Length field with value zero. As this one-byte field is digitally signed in the
proposed scheme, it will contribute to the string on which the signature is computed
and result in an invalid signature. The only way to avoid this byte being part of the
signature is to make the second record into a chunk. However, this requires TNF=6
and so prevents the value TNF=5 which is needed to hide the record’s payload in
the attack. Thus, the Record Decomposition Attack is successfully countered in the
proposed scheme.
The specification for the unknown type record with TNF=5 has some redundant
data. The Type-Length field is always zero and therefore redundant. This redundancy,
in contrast to the record chunking case, proves to be a mechanism preventing the
Record Decomposition Attack. If it were removed, the heading requirement for the
hidden parts of the payload in the Record Decomposition Attack would be the first
NDEF header byte and the Payload-Length field. If none of this information were
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included in the revised signature specification, data from the header fields would not
invalidate the signature. Therefore excluding this redundancy would make the Record
Decomposition Attack feasible for the revised signature specification if it excluded
TNFB and Total-Payload.
In conclusion, although the Type-Length field is redundant in an unknown type
record, it helps prevent the Record Decomposing Attack. Nevertheless, other fields
in the proposed signature specification ensure that this redundancy could be safely
removed.
Other Malicious Combinations of Records
This section discusses other potentially malicious combinations of records with respect
to the proposed signature specification. Previous analysis considered all possibilities for
hiding part of a signed payload. One can ask if there are other changes to a sequence
of records which would not affect the signature. The first such combination is to sign
the last of the middle and terminating chunks (and perhaps more subsequent records)
while omitting the initial and the first few middle chunks. Although the signature
specification only covers the complete sequence of chunks, it could be abused, with the
first chunk to be signed being treated as the initial chunk, contributing its values for
the ID and Type, among other things. This combination might have its Type and
ID properties changed since they are inherited from the initial chunk which may not
have been signed. However, such a change is not allowable according to the NDEF
specification [3]. This is because the first record in a sequence of signed records must
be the first record of the message or be preceded by a signature record. As a signature
record cannot be a chunk (it has TNF=1, not 6), the start of the signed sequence of
records must be before the initial chunk. Consequently, the Type and ID properties
and their lengths are always signed for the part of the payload which is signed.
Let us now consider manipulation of the unsigned bits in the first header byte. We
can ignore the MB and ME flags as they do not affect the semantic content of the
records.
Any alteration to the SR bit changes the location of the other signed bytes, such as
the Payload. This leads to an invalid signature unless there is a corresponding addition
or removal of three Payload-Length bytes. If this changes the value of Payload-Length
then the signature will be incorrect as that value is signed. If that value is unchanged
then the Payload is unchanged, so that the interpretation of the record is unchanged.
Hence if the SR bit can be changed without invalidating the signature then the message
content is unchanged.
Switching the IL bit without invalidating the signature is not possible except for
47
3.4. Countermeasures 3. Attacks on NDEF Specification
non-initial chunks where the value is irrelevant. Moreover, the IL flag is always zero
for non-initial chunks as defined in the NDEF specification [3]. Changing IL introduces
a byte for ID-Length into the signature stream or removes it, thereby altering the
signature.
Finally, we briefly comment on the need to include the TNF value in the signature.
For example, without TNFB, any of the values 1, 2, 3, 4 might be inter-changed without
change to the sequence of bytes being signed. This would lead to a different interpreta-
tion of the Type value and hence a different interpretation of the Payload. We would
then have to rely on the parser flagging an inconsistency. It is quite possible, although
unlikely, for the differently interpreted payload to convey incorrect information to the
user. Thus it is still wise to include TNFB in the signature scheme.
Modifications in the Existing Specifications
The proposed signature scheme is different from the existing one because of the addition
of, inter alia, Type-Length and ID-Length fields. As such, it must be assigned a
different version number in order to maintain backward compatibility. Fortunately, in
this specification there is a version number which can be incremented.
The payload of the signature RTD consists of three fields as noted in § 2.3.2: Version,
Signature and Certificate Chain. These three fields are transmitted in the same order,
with Version in first place. An NDEF parser can determine the signature specification
by first analyzing the version number. This is a single byte field so it can handle up
to 256 versions of signature specification. As the existing signature specification is the
only version presently available, the only currently valid version number is 1. So our
proposed signature specification should be given version number 2.
The proposed specification is not compatible with version 1 because of the extra
signed fields. Hence signature validators will have to be upgraded to enable version 2
signatures to be checked.
Regarding NDEF specification, implementing changes in the NDEF specification is
tricky as there is no Version field available in the NDEF format. But, our proposed
scheme is designed in such a way that it does not require any alteration in the NDEF
specification.
A Few Comments about the User Interface
A digitally signed NDEF message should display some information for the user at the
application level. It may include the name of the signing authority (from an x.509
certificate) with some additional details for the assurance of the user.
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Our consideration of security issues showed that it is still important for users to
be informed whether or not messages have been signed and for their browsers to make
clear where individual signed messages begin and end. It should not be possible for
signed messages to be concatenated without the user being aware where one message
has finished and the next has started.
A signature can potentially be removed from a tag without any indication to the
user (such as in a duplicate tag). It is up to the user whether he trusts the contents of a
message without a signature or not. However, it is clear from the example attacks that
the browser should be pro-active in warning the user of potential dangers, including
the lack of any signature.
3.4.2 Countermeasure II
We proposed another countermeasure to counter Record Composition / Decomposition
Attack. The countermeasure highlights that there is some redundant data in NDEF
specification. The redundant data not only results in communicational overheads but
also paves the way to such attacks. We removed the data redundancy and as a result,
we were able to add a few more fields to the signature record. On the positive side,
this countermeasure serves two purposes; it removes the data redundancy and, in par-
allel, serves as a countermeasure tool against such attacks. On the negative side, this
countermeasure requires revisions in the NDEF specification (in order to remove the
data redundancy) and in the signature specification (as more fields are added in the
signature). Whereas, the earlier proposed Countermeasure I (§ 3.4.1) requires revision
only in the signature specification.
Data Redundancy in the NDEF Specification
We discovered that some of the data transmitted according to NDEF specification is
redundant. The redundancy lies in the middle and terminating chunk records. The
middle and terminating record chunks have TNF=6, indicating that the Type and ID
of these records are unchanged. Therefore, the Type-Length and ID-length fields are
set to zero and the Type and ID fields are omitted, as explained in §2.3.1.
The Type-Length field and ID-length fields are redundant in the middle and ter-
minating record chunks, as TNF=6 indicates the same. As a result, these two fields
can actually be omitted from the middle and terminating chunks in the revised NDEF
specification.
We first revised the NDEF specification for record chunking process by omitting
these two fields from the middle and terminating record chunks. The new proposed
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CF 1 1 0
TNF As required 6 6
Type-Length Present – –
Payload-Length Present Present Present
ID-Length Present – –
Type Present – –
ID Present – –
Payload Present Present Present
Table 3.2: Proposed construction of chunk records.
construction of a record chunk with IL flag set is presented in Table 3.2. The MB, ME
and SR flags are not shown as they are used as required.
After the modifications in the record chunk structure, we proposed a revision in
the signature specification. The signature in now computed over the Type-Length,
ID-Length, Type, ID and payload fields as compared to Type, ID and payload in the
original specification as shown in Table 3.3.
Field Name Existing Proposed
NDEF Header Not signed Not signed
Type-Length Not signed Signed
Payload-Length Not signed Not signed




Table 3.3: Signing an NDEF Record: Countermeasure II
Counter to Record Composition / Decomposition Attacks
The Record Composition Attack (RCA) is successful because of the unsigned TNF
value. The TNF is still unsigned in this approach, yet it rules out the possibility of
RCA because of the inclusion of the associated fields in the signature.
The TNF is closely associated with the Type field and therefore the corresponding
Type-Length field. For example, an NDEF record with the TNF=5 has no Type field,
thus the Type-Length is zero. The Type-Length field is a single byte transmitted after
the NDEF header. It always stores a non-zero integer (unless TNF=5 or a chunk
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record). This field is digitally signed in our proposed scheme and thus cannot be
changed to zero. Changing the TNF value to 5 without changing the Type-Length
field results in an error. Hence, the RCA is not successful in this scheme.
In Record Decomposition Attack (RDA), the payload is split in two parts and spread
over two records. The second part is hidden by using a record of Unknown type, i.e.
TNF=5. Let the attacker split the original Payload P into two parts, a visible payload
(Pv) and a hidden payload (Ph). The Pv becomes the payload of the original record,
whereas the Ph is stored in a new hidden record with TNF=5. In this way, the hidden
payload will not appear to the user. However, in order to maintain the validity of the
signature, the attacker must look into the Type-Length and ID-Length fields of the
new hidden record, as both are now included in the signature. The attacker can omit
the ID-Length field in the hidden record as it is optional, but the attacker needs to
add a byte containing all zeros for the Type-Length field of the hidden record. Since
this field is included in the proposed signature scheme, the new string for signature
computation becomes Pv‖0x00‖Ph which is different from the original string Pv‖Ph.
Hence hiding records voids the signature and hence is unsuccessful.
The Record Decomposition Attack can be successful in the following, but very
unlikely, conditions.
• The original payload, P , contains eight consecutive zero bits somewhere in the
middle
• The string of zeros must be exactly at a location where the payload needs to split.
• Since the Payload-Length field represents the length of the payload in bytes, the
string of zeros must encompass an entire byte.
In such circumstances, the original payload P is split into three parts, Pv‖0x00‖Ph.
Pv is the payload of the visible record, 0x00 acts as the Type-Length field of the hidden
record and Ph is the payload of the hidden record. ID field, being optional, is omitted
in the hidden record. In this way, the string for signature computation remains the
same as it was in the original record.
3.5 Comments on the Candidate Signature Specification
V2.0
The attacks mentioned above along with the countermeasures were communicated to
the NFC Forum in 2012. As a consequence, the NFC Forum honoured our research
and revised the current signature RTD V1.0. The NFC Forum released the candidate
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specification of the updated signature RTD V2.0 for comments and feedback in April
2013 [9]. The updated version V2.0 is still open for comments and not yet finalsied.
The V2.0 is not backward compatible so once implemented, the older version V1.0
will be obsolete.
Apart from a few minor changes, the major change is about the use of the signature
RTD V2.0. According to the V2.0, the signature is computed over the entire NDEF
record, including the first byte of NDEF record, as compared to a selection of bytes
in V1.0. The first byte of NDEF record contains MB, MB, CF, SR, IL flags and a
3-bit TNF value. Although it looks more secure to include this byte in the signature,
it leads to various implementation issues. These issues were highlighted by M. Roland
and J. Langer prior to the release of the V1.0 [59]. We are also of the opinion that
the first byte of NDEF record should not be included as a whole in the signature
(Section §3.4). On the contrary, excluding this byte from signature results in various
attacks such as Record Composition / Decomposition Attack. Our both proposed
countermeasures handle this situation, but surprisingly, the V2.0 includes the header
field in the signature. We conveyed following two issues to the NFC Forum regarding
V2.0:
“The first problem is that the V2.0 undermines the flexibility to use
multiple NDEF records within a single message. Since MB flag is signed
in this approach, nothing can be added before a signed NDEF message.
This prevents a variety of messages to be constructed for different target
viewers around an important core content which is signed. Moreover, it is
unnecessary to sign the ME flag as the end of the section of the message
which needs to have its integrity secured is marked by the signature record,
so all the records preceding the signature record will have ME = 0.
The second problem with V2.0 is that the original signature gets invalid
if used with chunk records. There can be many occasions when a record is
required to be chunked. In such cases, the original signature gets invalid
as the chunked records require a new signature. The new signature will
invalidate the data origin authentication of the message unless the new
signature is computed by same entity. Similarly, a signature computed on
chunked records cannot be used with unchunked records. This result is loss
of data origin authentication.”
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3.6 Conclusion
The Record Composition and Decomposition Attacks exploit unsigned fields in the
NDEF header. Previously proposed attacks were not fully implementable without fur-
ther modifications to the NDEF header and lengths fields. We refined those attacks and
explained precisely what additional changes need to be made to exploit the unsigned
fields. Such attacks can be countered if the length fields of the NDEF header are also
signed, but in a specific way. We proposed two solutions that require modification to
the Signature RTD in which, amongst others, the TNF, Type-Length, Payload-Length
and ID-Length fields are included. We presented a security analysis of both of the
proposed schemes, and verified that it was no longer possible to exploit the NDEF
header in attacks of the type discussed, thus successfully countering Record Composi-
tion and Decomposition Attacks in particular. We communicated our work to the NFC
Forum and consequently, the NFC Forum released an updated version of the signature
specification [9].
The signature specification only authenticates the static data stored on the tag, so
it is vulnerable to tag cloning attacks. In the next chapter, we will design a framework




Off-line NFC Tag Authentication
This chapter provides a framework, based on NFC Forum specifications,
to authenticate an NFC tag in an off-line environment. This framework
is published in the International Conference for Internet Technology and
Secured Transactions 2012 [64]. This chapter is almost verbatim of the
published work.
4.1 Introduction
Near Field Communication (NFC) tags are used to store data in the format speci-
fied by the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) specification, published by the NFC
Forum [3]. Despite our investigations described in the previous chapter, here we will
assume that the authenticity of the stored data is guaranteed by a digital signature
which follows the Forum’s Signature Record Type Definition (Signature RTD) [7]. The
signature is computed over the tag’s contents and is stored in the signature record
on the tag along with the corresponding certificate for verification. This allows the
reader to check the authenticity of the data, but the signature specification does not
rule out tag cloning. The reason is that the signature specification deals only with the
static data, which can be replayed or cloned. Hence, there is a need of another layer
of protection for NFC tags that address cloning issues.
NFC tags are used in a variety of applications like product identification, smart
posters, access control etc. There are occasions where copying the contents of an NFC
tag to another tag is undesirable. An example of such a scenario is a signed NFC tag
attached to a medicine packet storing its chemical composition and expiry date. Any
NFC Forum device can read its contents and verify it using the signature. However, a
counterfeit medicine and counterfeit tag with the same data will also be authenticated.
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At present, the NFC Forum does not provide any specification to authenticate the tag.
The lack of such a mechanism opens the door to many security threats, and particularly
to counterfeit products when NFC technology is used in product identification.
We address this weakness by providing a mechanism based on the NDEF specifi-
cation to authenticate NFC tags. The main advantage of our proposed specification
is its compatibility with existing NFC Forum devices. This contribution to the NFC
framework enables the successful authentication of such tags along with their data. It
adds another layer of defence to the NFC security framework, making it more secure
for future applications.
Tag authentication also serves as a tool for data authentication at no extra cost for
a read-only tag, whereas its converse is not always true. Therefore we emphasize that
tag authentication is an important security measure as it provides both tag and data
authentication for read-only tags.
In an off-line environment, when there is no shared secret between the tag and
the reader, it is very challenging to differentiate between legitimate and counterfeit
tags (§ 4.2.2). Our framework for tag authentication is designed to work in an off-line
environment. The proposal is based on a challenge-response protocol using public key
cryptography and a PKI. In order to make the framework compatible with existing
NFC Forum devices, a new Tag Authentication Record, designed according to the NFC
Data Exchange Format (NDEF), is introduced.
After developing a counterfeit tag-detection framework, we also proposed its imple-
mentation architecture to detect counterfeit products in a supply chain. This will be
discussed in the next chapter.
In this chapter, we require to extend the NFC Forum well-known type records,
for which TNF=1, as our proposed Tag Authentication Record in § 4.4.2 falls into
this category. Each of the well-known types is identified by its name, identifier and a
character code as allocated by the NFC Forum. The current list of well-known types
is given in Table 4.1.
4.2 Tag Authentication Scenarios
Since NFC tags can be used in a variety of applications, the techniques for tag auth-
entication also vary a lot. Tag authentication can be categorized as follows into two
main categories depending upon the tag’s environment [45].
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Type Name Type ID Hexadecimal Encoding
Generic Control Gc 0x4763
Text T 0x54
URI U 0x55





Table 4.1: NFC Forum Well-Known Types (i.e. TNF =1)
4.2.1 On-line Authentication
In the On-line category, there is secret information shared between a tag and the reader
as a result of the reader having access to a server containing a database of secrets. This
scenario is normally applicable in a closed environment like product identification in
supply chain management or access control. The reader accesses the database to obtain
the tag’s secret and then ascertains whether the tag knows that secret or not. Since
the secret is not accessible to an attacker, a duplicate tag lacks it and can be detected.
There are various methods developed to authenticate RFID tags using an on-line
authentication mechanism. Weis et al. proposed a mechanism to lock a tag without
storing the access key on the tag [70] . Instead, the hash of the key is stored on the
tag. The actual key is stored in a back end database where it can be found using the
tag’s ID. Unlocking a tag corresponds to tag authentication. Juels et al. proposed an
approach to authenticate an RFID tag embedded in a bank note [41]. They provided a
mechanism for law enforcement agencies to ascertain the validity of a bank note issued
by a central bank. Bank notes are equipped with RFID tags and have unique serial
numbers. The ciphertext on the serial number is printed on the note and stored in
the RFID tag as well. The law enforcement agencies can verify the ciphertext on the
serial number by communicating with the central bank. Juels [38] proposed a mutual
authentication protocol for EPC Class-1 Generation-2 tags. The tag ID is altered after
every authentication process to prevent traceability attacks. The cloning resistance is
provided by the ‘kill-password’, a secret in each tag. The kill-password is unique to
each EPC tag, known to tag itself and the legitimate reader. When an EPC tag receives
a legitimate ‘kill-password’ from a reader, it self-destructs. If the ‘kill-password’ is not
correct, the tag simply ignores the command. However, if the tag does to have sufficient
power to self-destruct, it sends a ‘fail’ message to the reader. Hence, receiving a ‘fail’
message in response to the ‘kill-password’ is an indication that the tag is not cloned
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(provided that the reader has some control over the transmitted power). Ranasinghe
et al. [57] proposed a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) based challenge-response
protocol to authenticate a tag. The challenge-response pairs, generated by a trusted
party and stored on a back-end server, are used for tag authentication.
A review of existing tag authentication techniques is available in [45]. In gen-
eral, these techniques use on-line servers and execute a challenge-response protocol to
authenticate the tag. They cannot, in general, be adapted successfully to the off-line
environment.
4.2.2 Off-line Authentication
There are occasions when there is no shared secret between the tag and the reader.
Any reader can access the tag and read its contents. The process of authenticating the
tag or the reader or both in such scenarios is called Off-line authentication. Normally,
it is just the tag that needs to be authenticated. An NFC smart poster or an NFC tag
for product identification falls into such a category as its contents are accessible to any
reader without the need for a shared secret.
Off-line authentication becomes challenging in an RFID environment owing to the
low computational power of RFID tags. The typical low cost tag is currently unable
to perform any useful public key cryptography.
Pim Tuyls and Lejla Batina claim the first tag authentication model for RFIDs
in an off-line environment [68]. They used a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
integrated with the RFID chip (an Integrated PUF or IPUF ). In their model, several
fingerprints are derived from the PUF by sending it multiple challenges and recording
the responses. The challenges and corresponding fingerprints are digitally signed and
printed on the product (if used in the case of supply chain management). The verifier
reads a challenge/response pair from the data printed on the product or packaging
and sends the challenge to the tag to compute the response. On receipt, the verifier
compares the response with the expected fingerprint. A successful match authenticates
the tag.
The main drawback with this scheme is the limited number of challenges and cor-
responding fingerprints available in the tag’s memory or printed on the product. An
attacker can record all the challenge/response pairs and program another tag with the
same pairs resulting in a successfully cloned tag.
Another anti-cloning approach in the RFID framework, known as Active Authentic-
ation (AA), is used in ePassports where an RFID tag is used to add more security to
an ordinary passport [40]. This approach uses public key cryptography where the tag
digitally signs the challenge received from the reader.
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Anti-cloning feature of the EMV cards provides another approach to fight cloning
issues. Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) verifies the legitimacy of the card by
digitally signing a random challenge generated by the terminal [58]. Detail of the EMV
model is described in § 4.5.3.
Alex Arbit et al. presented a public-key based anti-counterfeiting system for the
Electronic Product Code (EPC) standard [11]. They implemented a variant of the
well-known Rabin encryption scheme with a 1024-bit key [53].
4.3 NFC Tag Authentication
Tag authentication requires a framework that distinguishes a legitimate tag from a
counterfeit tag. The counterfeit may or may not store the same data as the original.
A duplicate with some alteration in the stored data is obviously a potential threat to
the system. However, there are occasions where a duplicate with the same data is not
desirable either. We describe such a tag as a cloned tag. Examples of such scenarios
are ePassports [35], product identification, access control etc.
Conversely, there are cases where a cloned tag may be considered desirable: for
example, an NFC tag used as a smart poster where the integrity of the tag contents
is protected by a Signature record. The more a smart poster is cloned, the more its
contents are advertised.
As observed in § 4.2.2, NFC tags may be used for product identification in an
off-line environment. The information stored in the NFC tag is product specific and
aimed to assist an off-line user to know about the specification and legitimacy of the
attached product. The data on the tag is protected by the signature record and a
valid signature is an indication of a genuine product. Unfortunately, the same data
can be stored on a duplicate NFC tag affixed to an inferior product. The signature
remains valid as it is the same data as in the original tag. Since the signature is valid,
the user is led to believe that the product is genuine, whereas it is not. This happens
because the signature specification authenticates only the stored data on NFC tag. An
easy way to avoid such attacks is to include the tag’s ID in the signature in order to
detect a cloned tag with a different tag ID. But an attacker can affix to the counterfeit
product a programmable tag which returns the same ID as the original. In this case,
the counterfeit is authenticated as a genuine product with very little investment by the
attacker.
This attack works because the tag is not authenticated along with its data and
a static identifier is used to authenticate the tag. Lack of any tag authenticating
mechanism opens doors to counterfeit products being accepted as genuine products.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed Tag Authentication Protocol
At present, the NFC Forum has not specified any mechanism to authenticate the tag.
In the absence of such a mechanism, NFC tags based on the NFC Forum specification
cannot be used for secure product identification.
In this chapter, we propose a solution to detect cloned NFC tags used in an off-line
environment. Our solution is formulated within the NDEF specification and introduces
a new Tag Authentication Record containing parts of a digital certificate. The main
advantage of introducing such a new record is its compatibility with existing NFC Fo-
rum devices. The authentication is then performed using a challenge-response protocol
employing public key cryptography and a PKI.
4.4 Proposed Tag Authentication Scheme
As noted in § 4.2, NFC tags can be used in both on-line and off-line environments.
Our scheme for authenticating a tag in an off-line environment is based on the Active
Authentication scheme of the ePassport [35] but modified to fit the NFC architecture.
The scheme is applicable to at least NFC Type-4 tags as these tags are computationally
powerful enough. Such tags satisfy ISO 7816-4 and contain a cryptographic processor.
They can compute asymmetric or symmetric key encryption [2]. The scheme may
be applied to other tags in future as their computational power increases over time.
Moreover, light-weight versions of public key encryption schemes may also appear and
allow wider applicability. In the scheme, the tag signs a challenge and the reader verifies
the signed response as shown in Fig. 4.1.
The following assumptions are required for the scheme to work:
• Both the reader and the tag can perform public key encryption/decryption.
• The memory location where the secret key is stored inside the tag is not accessible
to any reader.
• The reader possesses the root CA certificate to validate the signature.
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Our scheme differs from the standard methods of authentication used in smart cards/SIM
cards because the latter requires an on-line environment. A SIM card stores a secret
key K at a secure location in the card. The same key is also stored with the mobile
network operator. During authentication, the network executes a challenge-response
protocol to verify knowledge of K by the SIM. A cloned SIM should lack the key and
so would be detected. A similar approach is used in smart cards issued by banks for
monetary transactions. However, in our context there is no opportunity to share a
secret. Although it is feasible with the right equipment to ‘hack’ the NFC tag and
recover the private key, we will assume that it is not cost-effective for an attacker to
do this and that therefore the private key is not present in the cloned tag,
4.4.1 The Tag Authentication Digital Certificate
Before describing the protocol, it is useful to define the public key certificate which
it uses and the structure of the proposed new Tag Authentication record which stores
part of its contents. The certificate requires at least the following six fields:
1. Protocol Version
2. Challenge Signature Scheme
3. Challenge Public Key
4. Supplementary Text
5. Certificate Signature Algorithm
6. Certificate Signature
The Protocol Version field determines which version of the Tag Authentication spec-
ification is being used. This allows for future expansion and developments. The Chal-
lenge Signature Scheme field specifies which digital signature algorithm, along with the
relevant parameters, is used by the tag to sign the challenge, and the Challenge Public
Key field stores the public key information associated with verifying this signature.
The Certificate Signature field is the signature on the records containing the first four
fields, computed using the algorithm defined by the Certificate Signature Algorithm
field. It follows the NFC Forum signature specification scheme [7]. The Supplementary
Text field has various uses which are described below.
The certificate might follow the X.509 specification [6], or a simplification with fewer
critical fields. Clearly, it may be necessary to add further fields in future, such as an
expiry date to deter the illegal re-use of tags. In the case of X.509, the Extensions field
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enables the inclusion of the Supplementary Text. That field also allows the certificate
to be restricted to this NFC application, which is useful because less computationally
extensive cryptography is expected than is normally acceptable in other situations. We
will not consider the encoding of the certificate any further beyond observing that space
is at a premium on a typical tag. Therefore one would want to reduce, for example,
the twenty or so bytes used for identification of the signature algorithm in an X.509
certificate to just one byte.
The stored data and data transmitted between tag and reader is in the format of
NDEF records. In order to store the public key information, we propose a new Tag
Authentication record. The first three certificate fields are to be stored in the payload
field of this record, the Supplementary Text is stored in normal NFC Forum text records
on the tag, and the last two fields are placed in an NFC signature record.
4.4.2 The Tag Authentication Record
The Tag Authentication Record serves two purposes: it stores the public key informa-
tion necessary to verify the signature on a challenge, and its presence is a claim that the
tag is equipped with anti-cloning features. Indeed, such records should not be allowed
in tags without the ability to enact the authentication protocol. The proposed record
follows the NDEF structure given in Fig. 2.2 with a TNF value of 1. Its Type should
therefore be added to the set of NFC Forum well-known types, and the type name of
‘Ta’ (for ‘Tag Authentication’), with hexadecimal encoding 0x5461, added to the list
in Table 4.1. Given the general nature of the construction, the record may have much
wider uses in future, authenticating other entities than tags. It may therefore make
more sense to call it a Certificate Record with a different type identifier.
4.4.3 The Supplementary Text Field
As space is limited on tags, it will often be useful to have a single signature covering
some or all of the message content in the tag, rather than having separate signatures
on the certificate and the message for users. The Supplementary Text field enables this
to be done by using it for message content. The signature then ties this content to the
particular tag. For convenience, it is assumed in the implementation details below that
one signature is indeed used to cover both the text message and the Ta record fields.
In future, the Supplementary Text may have to be structured into subfields if it is
used for several purposes.
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4.4.4 Protocol Execution Sequence
The scheme is executed in two phases:
1. Initialisation Phase. After selecting the version number and signature scheme,
a public-private key pair (Kpub,Kpr) is generated in a secure way by a trusted
party and the private key Kpr is stored inside the tag at a secure location only
accessible to the tag processor for prescribed operations. The public key Kpub
is stored in the Challenge Public Key field of the payload of the authentication
record. This Ta record, along with the other records stored on the tag, is then
digitally signed by the same trusted party and the signature is stored in the signa-
ture record on the tag according to the NFC Forum Signature Specification. This
turns the Tag Authentication record into a signed digital certificate applicable to
NFC tags.
2. Verification Phase. The verification phase is executed as follows (see Fig. 4.2):
• The reader requests and obtains all the data from the tag. This data is in
the form of NDEF records.
• The reader verifies the integrity of the tag’s contents by verifying the signa-
ture. A valid signature indicates that the tag contents are authentic.
• Next, the reader looks for a Tag Authentication record by searching for
record type ‘Ta’. Its absence indicates that the tag is not protected by
the anti-cloning feature and the Tag Authentication protocol terminates
unsuccessfully.
• Otherwise, the payload of the Tag Authentication record is extracted and,
assuming the reader can support the required signature scheme, an appro-
priate challenge c is generated and sent to the tag.
• The tag now uses its private key Kpr to compute the digital signature of c
with the specified padding, and sends the result back to the reader.
• The reader verifies the signature on c using the public key Kpub from the
certificate. Successful verification indicates knowledge of the secret key and
hence the legitimacy of the tag, whereas failure indicates a cloned or dam-
aged tag.
4.5 Analysis
This scheme successfully detects a cloned tag from an original tag because a cloned tag
lacks the private key Kpr corresponding to the public key Kpub available in the Tag
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Figure 4.2: Verification Process
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Authentication record. However, there are several issues that need to be discussed in
detail.
4.5.1 Backward Compatibility
The backward compatibility of the tag authenticating protocol can be assessed by
following two scenarios. We use “plain” to describe a reader without authenticating
ability, and a tag without authentication response ability.
• An Authenticating reader and a plain tag. In this case, the reader starts
the verification process as shown in Fig. 4.2. The plain tag lacks this feature so
there should be no Ta record in its contents. In this case the verification process
stops with the conclusion that the tag cannot be authenticated. However, if there
is a Ta record, then the plain tag is unable to respond to the challenge. Again
the process terminates with the conclusion that the tag cannot be authenticated.
Since a plain tag should not contain a Ta record, the reader can reasonably
conclude that the tag is cloned. Notice that this requires that plain tags are not
loaded with a Ta record. As we noted earlier, existence of the Ta record should
be viewed as a claim that the tag does support the authentication protocol.
• A Plain reader and an authenticatable tag. In this case, the Ta record
is present in the tag but the reader does not support the tag authentication
protocol. Although the reader recognises the TNF field value 1, the record type
‘Ta’ is unknown to it. According to the NFC Forum specification [3] §3.2.10, an
NDEF parser receiving an NDEF record with a supported TNF value but an
unrecognised Type field must interpret that record as being of Unknown type,
i.e. TNF=5. So the Ta record is ignored. Thus the system remains backward
compatible in this scenario as well.
4.5.2 Implementation Issues
One of our concerns in our proposal is the implementation of public key cryptography
on NFC tags. We have not evaluated our protocol for any particular public key algo-
rithm, but the chip area, current consumption and clock cycles are important factors
to consider alongside the security of the algorithm. So the selection of the algorithm
that can be implemented on an NFC tag is of prime importance. Some lightweight
public key algorithms are being proposed, notable among them is the WIPR, proposed
by Yossef Oren and Martin Feldhofer [52]. WIPR offers 80 bits security and fits com-
pletely (including RAM) into 5705 Gate Equivalents (GE) and has a mean current
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consumption of 10.88 µA with 66048 clock cycles. WIPR is more efficient than ECC-
192 but it uses much more resources than AES (3400 GE with 3.4 µA and 1032 clock
cycles) as shown in Figure 4.31.
Figure 4.3: Comparison of WIPR with other Algorithms (Based on Table 4 in [53]).
4.5.3 EMV Card Authentication Model
The EMV standard defines three card authentication mechanisms [58, 25]:
1. Static Data Authentication (SDA): SDA is an off-line authentication method
where the card provides a digitally signed data (e.g. card number, expiry date) to
the terminal. the terminal knows the issuer’s public key, it can authenticate the
data stored on the tag. Due to the static nature of the authentication data, the
same set is used in all transactions throughout a card’s lifetime. Moreover, the
data is transmitted in clear to the terminal during authentication, hence easily
intercepted by adversaries while in transit. These weaknesses allow replay attacks
or card cloning attacks.
2. Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA): DDA is implemented on the cards
that support public key cryptography and have a public/private key pair. DDA
1The figure is presented by Martin Feldhofer and Yossef Oren on a talk at Second ACM conference
in Wireless Network Security (WiSec) [53]. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/170423767/WIPR-WiSec
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verifies that a card is genuine by verifying the existence of a valid card resident
cryptographic key. This is carried out by a challenge-response mechanism, where
the card proves its authenticity by signing a challenge chosen by the terminal
using a private asymmetric key. Unlike SDA, this does rule out cloning and
replay attacks.
After the authentication of the card, DDA does not tie the subsequent transaction
to the card.
3. Combined Data Authentication (CDA): CDA repairs this deficiency of
DDA. With CDA, the card digitally signs all important transaction data, not
only authenticating the card, but also authenticating the transaction.
Since all three authentication mechanisms require a Public Key Infrastructure to
function, the EMV has standardized it [24]. For SDA cards, the card issuer’s private
key is used to generate a digital signature on the card data. The issuer (e.g., bank) then
puts the digital signature and the corresponding CA-signed issuer’s certificate onto the
card. Each ATM/POS terminal has the actual CA public key available, and hence can
verify the legitimacy of the issuer’s certificate. The terminal then verifies the signature
on the card’s data.
For DDA and CDA, the card issuer generates a public/private key pair for each
card. The private key is stored inside the card at a location only accessible to card
processor. The corresponding public key is stored in a card certificate, and the card
issuer (e.g, bank) signs the card certificate with its private key. The card certificate
is stored on the card together with the issuer’s certificate. The issuer’s certificate is
signed by the CA and each ATM/POS terminal has the actual CA public key. Thus,
every certificate in the certificate chain is verified with the verification of the signature.
A closer look on these mechanisms reveals that the SDA is analogous to the NFC
Forum Signature specification (explained in Chapter 2, § 2.3.2), whereas the DDA is
analogous to our proposed Tag Authentication specification (described in this chapter).
The NFC Forum signature specification provides a guideline to digitally sign the tag’s
contents, but it does not prevent tag cloning. The proposed Tag Authentication Record
is based on a similar model to DDA and rules out the cloning attacks.
4.5.4 Tag Message as a Digital Certificate
It was noted above that the Ta record and the rest of the tag message can be signed
separately, giving two signature records, or can be signed as one, yielding a single sig-
nature record. The former provides a clean separation between the tag authentication
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processes and the message authentication processes at all levels from signing to verifi-
cation. However, the latter binds the message to the specific tag: the message cannot
be ported to another tag because that tag does not know Kpr, and will be detected as
noted above even on a tag which does not have authentication capability. This solution
also seems preferable because of restricted space. Respectively, these two alternatives
both have interpretations of the Ta record with its corresponding signature record and
optional message as a digital certificate.
4.5.5 Strengths and Weaknesses
The strength of our proposed scheme relies on the strength of the signature scheme,
secure location of the private key Kpr inside the tag’s memory and the integrity of the
public certificate verification key Kcert, say, in the reader. The first is a well matured
area of information security, and the emergence of elliptic curve cryptography means
that at least the certificate fields on the tag can be signed securely to yield a fairly
short signature. However, the cryptography used by the tag to sign the challenge will
often be fairly weak because of the low electrical or cryptographic power available to
the tag. One needs to recognise that an attacker can send numerous challenges to the
tag and record the replies and may therefore be able to break a weak system. The
second issue, the maintained secrecy of Kpr, depends very much on what the customer
is prepared to pay for the tag, and accessibility to the tag during its life. Unless the
attacker can recover Kpr, he is unable to use the tag’s digital certificate on a clone.
It is indeed easy for an attacker to extract the key from a cheap tag if it can be
taken to a laboratory for further study. Thirdly, if the integrity of the key Kcert can
be compromised, the attacker can make a successful clone of a tag even when it is
protected by a Ta record. The attacker stores his own private key K ′pr in the cloned
tag and the corresponding public key K ′pub is stored in its Ta record, which the attacker
signs. The public verification key K ′cert corresponding to this signature is then used
to replace the correct key in the reader. Consequently, the reader believes it has an
authentic tag when it verifies the clone. This results in a successful attack. This attack
can be avoided if the verification process also includes verification of the certificate
chain stored in the Signature record. The certificate chain does not store the top-most
certificate (e.g., the root Certificate Authority certificate in an X.509 certificate chain),
therefore the cell phone needs to access it online, or through any other mean, if the
root certificate is not already stored in its memory. Additionally, the cell phone also
needs to check the validity of all certificates in the certificate chain for any revocation
by visiting the Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
In our proposed scheme, the integrity of the Ta record is assured by digitally signing
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this record, and perhaps others, according to the signature specification (Version 1.0)
provided by the NFC Forum [7]. Recent attacks on signed NDEF records [63] put
a question mark on the integrity of the tag’s contents even if they are signed. The
Ta record can be made inactive in a cloned tag by changing its TNF value to 5 with
some compensating alteration in the length fields, as mentioned in [63], to preserve
the validity of the signature. Since the TNF and length fields are not included in the
signature, these alterations will not invalidate the signature. Now the verifier will not
execute the tag authentication protocol since it does not recognise the Ta record as
such. Nevertheless, if the reader is expecting an authenticatable tag, it should flag this
to the operator 2.
4.6 Conclusion
Application of NFC technology to monetary and similar transactions requires strict ad-
herence to appropriately sound measures to ensure the necessary high level of security
in the NFC framework. The recently published NFC Forum Signature Specification
provides assurance of data integrity in NFC tags through the digital signing of NDEF
messages. However, no mechanism is provided by the NFC Forum for detecting a coun-
terfeit or cloned tag. This results in various possibilities for malicious activities where
a legitimate tag is replaced by a counterfeit tag and the NFC tag reader is unable to
detect the counterfeit. We proposed a framework to counter such attacks by provid-
ing a tag authenticating mechanism, “analogous to the EMV’s DDA on bank cards”.
It introduces a new Tag Authentication Record that provides relevant information to
authenticate a tag in an off-line environment. It employs public key cryptography with
digital certificates and so can be used on NFC tags that have sufficient computational
power and resources to perform such operations. The Tag Authentication Record is
based on the NFC Data Exchange Format and is thus compatible with all NFC Forum
devices. The NFC tag simply signs a challenge c and returns the signature to the NFC
reader. The NFC reader verifies the signature according to the information available
in the previously communicated Tag Authentication record. A successful verification
confirms that the tag is not cloned. Of course, the certificate chain should also be
checked for any revocation.
In the next chapter, we will apply this framework in a supply chain to detect
counterfeit products. The legitimacy of products, equipped with NFC tags, will be
determined by authenticating the NFC tags; a cloned tag implies a counterfeit product.
2This referenced vulnerability of the signature specification is addressed by adding more fields to





In this chapter we present a framework to detect counterfeit products in a
supply chain using NFC tags. This work is published in the International
conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST 2013) [61]. This chapter
is almost verbatim of the published work.
5.1 Introduction
Our tag authentication model, proposed in the previous chapter, can be used to detect
counterfeit products in a supply chain when products are equipped with clone-resistant
NFC tags. A cloned tag points to a counterfeit product. This chapter provides a
counterfeit detection model where consumers can detect a cloned tag (or in other words,
a counterfeit product) with their cell phones.
Counterfeit products are one of the major threats to modern commerce. Accord-
ing to estimates by the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), counterfeit goods make up 5 to 7% of world trade [13].
Counterfeits are available in a wide range of products, typically starting from high
value small goods like watches, designer clothes, DVDs and electronic chips to high
cost items such as cars, motorcycles and bicycles.
Counterfeit products are classified into four categories [16].
1. The first category consists of those products that are inexpensive, lower quality
and may lack original packaging. This category is often called ‘knockoff’. These
products are being sold as counterfeits and the consumer is aware of it.
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2. In the second category of counterfeit, a genuine product is reverse engineered
and identical copies are sold as the genuine product. It is hard for a consumer
to differentiate between a genuine and a counterfeit product. This category is
meant to deceive the consumer.
3. These are the products that are produced by an outsourced manufacturer without
intimation to, and without permission from, the original owner. For example, an
outsourced manufacturer manufactures further product after termination of its
contract with the original owner without notifying the original owner.
4. These are genuine products that do not meet the manufacturer’s standards but
are not labelled as faulty.
One of the major outlets for counterfeit products is Internet e-commerce where the con-
sumer has no means of authenticating a product before delivery. Even after delivery,
the consumer has very limited resources to determine the legitimacy of a product. Auc-
tion websites, such as eBay, have further expanded the market of counterfeit products.
For example, test purchases from 300,000 Dior products and 150,000 Vuitton items
offered on eBay during 2006 found 90% counterfeits [49]. Tiffany & Co. purchased 186
random items from eBay and found only 5% to be genuine [20].
These circumstances call for mechanisms to fight counterfeiting. Analysis shows
that the money spent in this way prevented a much greater loss from counterfeit goods.
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, $5 is gained for every $1 invested in this
battle [67].
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags attached to various goods provide a
tool to remotely identify these goods. Among these, EPC tags are the most important.
The Electronic Product Code (EPC) network is used for supply chain management and
can be used as a tool for anti-counterfeiting [65]. Every item equipped with an EPC
tag carries a 96-bit code to uniquely identify and manage the item in a supply chain.
There are two main approaches to using the EPC as an anti-counterfeiting measure [44].
The first approach is tracking the physical location of a tag and updating the result
in an online database. The EPC of a counterfeit product will appear twice (at least)
in the database, assuming the counterfeit product is equipped with a cloned EPC tag
and the database is up to date. This is called the ‘Track and Trace’ approach. The
main disadvantage of this approach is its significant communication and computation
overheads. Every reader has to update records in the online server in real time. The
online server has to track and trace each code received from the online reader and
generate triggers in case of any abnormality. In addition to these overheads, there
are also some privacy concerns associated with this approach: for example, tracking
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of individuals from the products they carry, or tracking medicines etc [12]. Moreover,
there are some issues with updating the database. For example, suppose a retailer were
to clone the EPC and attach the cloned tag to a counterfeit product. Assume he does
not update the corresponding record in the database when it is sold. When he sells the
counterfeit product, the consumer buying the counterfeit can check and find a valid
record for the cloned EPC but will not be able to update its record to record its sale
due to limited access and privacy concerns.
Another anti-counterfeiting approach is based on cryptography. In this approach,
each tag contains a secret value, knowledge of which is established by the reader in an
authentication proof. Generally, this uses an encrypted challenge-response protocol as
it may be eavesdropped and the secret cloned if sent in the clear. This approach may
be based on symmetric key or asymmetric key cryptography.
Anti-counterfeiting based on cryptography can be categorized into two main cate-
gories as described in § 4.2: Off-line and On-line. In a supply chain, it is very unlikely
that the login credentials are provided to a consumer to access the database in order
to verify the authenticity a product. There could be a special login account just for
verification with restriction (no update or general read rights). But this may lead to
information leakage if not properly implemented or monitored. This makes the Off-line
approach more suitable for product authentication at the consumer level.
If symmetric key cryptography is used, the reader must already know the secret
value of the tag and match it against the secret value received from the tag. The
secret value of each tag is chosen uniquely so that if a tag is compromised, it should
not break the entire system. This results in a requirement for a secure and efficient
key distribution mechanism to distribute the tags’ secrets among the readers. One
way is to deliver the secret values of all appropriate tags to readers in advance but
this approach requires secure distribution of millions of such keys and is considered
infeasible. Another way is to store the key database in an online server. This server is
online at all times to provide the secret values of tags to readers. Assuming millions of
tags are deployed in the supply chain with hundreds of compatible RFID readers, this
approach incurs even higher communication and storage overheads than the track and
trace approach [44]. In addition, the reader must always be trusted by the supplier since
the reader stores the secret values of the tags in any framework employing symmetric
key cryptography.
As observed earlier, one of the major factors in the upsurge in counterfeit products
is online shopping. With the advancement in Internet technology, the volume of online
shopping is growing rapidly. It is not feasible at present to tailor any symmetric key
approach for product authentication to online shopping. The reason is obvious: a con-
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sumer receiving a product through online shopping does not possess an RFID reader to
communicate with the tag attached to the product. Even in the very unlikely scenario
where a consumer possesses an RFID compatible reader, the supplier will have to pro-
vide login credentials to access the database. This situation is far from practical. Thus,
product authentication at the consumer level remains an open challenge, especially for
the Internet shopping framework.
In contrast to the symmetric key approach, asymmetric key cryptography (or Public
Key Cryptography (PKC)) can also be used to authenticate a product. Considering
the limitations of the symmetric key approach described above, the case for PKC in
product authentication is thus very strong. The main restriction in using PKC on
RFID tags, such as EPC tags, is the limited computational and storage capabilities
of these tags. Recently, Alex Arbit et al. presented a working implementation of a
PKC-based anti-counterfeiting framework [12]. We revised this model and provided a
better approach to counterfeit detection.
5.1.1 Our Contribution
We focus our work on detecting counterfeits that fall into the categories 2 and 3 men-
tioned in § 5.1. Category 1 counterfeits are not a major concern as the consumers are
aware of the fact that the products they are buying are counterfeits. The loss in the
sales of the original product owner is also negligible as very few genuine goods pur-
chasers would purchase a knock off [16]. Category 4 counterfeits can be restricted by
the genuine product owner by enforcing efficient quality control measures. Categories
2 and 3 are most critical as not only is the consumer unaware of the illegitimacy of
the product, but also the genuine owner has no or minimal control over the produc-
tion, marketing and selling of such products. Our model helps in detecting counterfeits
products at consumer level pertaining to category 2 and 3 products, thus providing an
efficient tool to detect counterfeits.
In this chapter, we analyse the anti-counterfeiting model which Alex Arbit et al. pro-
posed in [12] and highlight a few of its short-comings. The framework is semi-oﬄine,
where the verification and decryption keys are dispatched to the reader using a smart
card and the reader is considered as a secure module for storing these keys. Its semi-
oﬄine structure renders it sometimes incapable of authenticating a product at consumer
level despite using public key cryptography.
We revise and extend their work in two main ways. Firstly, we restore the EPC tag
to the original standard rather than using the modified EPC tag in the Alex Arbit et
al. model. This resolves any modification-related problems in the existing EPC frame-
work. Secondly, we supplement the EPC tag with an NFC tag which can perform the
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necessary computations that were not within the capability of the EPC tag. The main
advantage of being oﬄine is that a consumer can authenticate a product without any
online communication with the supplier’s database. Message integrity in our proposal
is provided by digital signatures so the consumer needs to verify the certificate chain
for the validity of the certificates. This can be done by connecting to the Internet and
checking the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). We believe that our oﬄine product
authentication at consumer level can prove to be an efficient anti-counterfeiting tool.
Although our framework is applicable to all levels of supply chain management, the
main beneficiaries are customers using the Internet for online shopping. This frame-
work not only helps the customers to authenticate a product, but any verifier such as
a law enforcement agency can also use this model to detect counterfeit products.
We resolve the problem of provisioning of an RFID reader for product authentic-
ation to every consumer by also using a Near Field Communication (NFC) tag for the
EPC. NFC technology is now available on cell phones and so a consumer’s cell phone
can act like an RFID reader to read the EPC. Since our framework is totally oﬄine,
the consumer is able to distinguish between a legitimate and a counterfeit product by
using his cell phone without accessing the supplier’s database.
We also resolve the issue of trust in the reader for an oﬄine framework. In the
work of Alex Arbit et al, the reader is a secure module storing a verification key and
a decryption key, as noted earlier in this section. These keys cannot be stored on any
reader that is untrusted by the supplier. Although the consumer’s cell phone is not
trusted by the supplier, this issue can be addressed by using a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI), thereby all but eliminating any key storage requirement on the reader side.
In many cases, the NFC tag can also be accessed and authenticated during product
distribution without having to resort to the greater reading range of the EPC tag.
5.2 EPC in the Supply Chain
The EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 (EPC C1G2) standard [5] specifies low-cost UHF tags
which operate in the frequency range of 860-960 MHz and have a read range of 2-10 me-
ters. This longer range makes UHF tags more easily read in containers and warehouses
than is the case with NFC tags. Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags are typically
deployed in supply chain management systems for automated inventory checks. The
EPC is a 96-bit identifier stored in the EPC tag which helps to identify each tagged
product uniquely. EPC has various advantages over existing product identification
techniques, e.g. barcodes, as the former does not require line of sight compared to the
latter. Moreover, the EPC tag may store additional information about the product
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which cannot be achieved using a barcode. Because of these advantages, barcodes are
often being replaced by EPC tags in the supply chain.
5.3 Related Work
The EPC network as an anti-counterfeiting tool was proposed by Staake et al. [65].
The proposal is based on a central database server and does not explicitly cover the
use of cryptography. The BRIDGE project [44] analysed various anti-counterfeiting
approaches based on RFID tags. This work analysed the secure distribution and man-
agement of secret keys in a symmetric key anti-counterfeiting framework, and showed
that it results in ten times more communication and computational overheads than in
a track-and-trace anti-counterfeiting system.
Work to reduce the computational overheads in public key cryptography is also
in progress and various lightweight public key cryptosystems are being designed. The
CRYPTOGPS is a light-weight public-key cryptosystem mainly suitable for UHF RFID
tags. It can be implemented in around 2800 GEs (Gate Equivalent) with a processing
time of around 720 cycles [55, 19]. The Rabin Cryptosystem was the first to be imple-
mented in a wireless sensor network in [53]. It took about 16,700 GEs to implement
512-bit encryption. This led the authors to declare that this cryptosystem was unsuit-
able for resource-constrained RFID tags. A lower version of this scheme, WIPR, was
developed by Oren and Feldhofer [11]. It is well suited to RFIDs because it has the
smallest hardware footprint and largest payload capacity of all published high-security
public key schemes. Recently, Alex Arbit et al. presented a working implementation of
a WIPR based anti-counterfeiting framework [12].
5.3.1 The Alex Arbit et al Anti-Counterfeiting Model
Alex Arbit et al proposed an anti-counterfeit model based on EPC tags and Public
Key Cryptography [12]. Their framework is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The figure represents the various entities involved in the anti-counterfeiting frame-
work. The framework consists of the following sequence of operations.
• Step 1: The framework is initiated by the Tag Integrator, who wishes to deploy
anti-counterfeiting technology in EPC tags. He creates two public-private key
pairs: a Private Signing Key KS together with its Pubic Verification Key KV ,
and a Private Decryption Key KD with its Public Encryption Key KE . The
signing key KS is never disclosed to any entity of the framework. The Tag
Integrator generates a list of Tag Identifiers (TIDs) and signs each TID with the
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Figure 5.1: Alex et al anti-counterfeiting framework
key KS . He then sends the list of signed TIDs to the tag manufacturer along
with the encryption key KE . Since the tag manufacturer lacks KS , he is unable
to generate arbitrary signed TIDs, thus ensuring the integrity of the TIDs.
• Step 2: The tag manufacturer produces and deploys the tags, each with an
individually signed TID from the list along with the public key KE .
• Step 3: The reader receives KD and KV from the tag integrator. Once these
keys are delivered to the reader, the system can operate in an oﬄine framework.
The reader then carries out a challenge-response protocol to determine that the
tag possesses a valid, signed TID.
This is a semi-oﬄine model as it requires an initial key distribution mechanism to
distribute keys to readers through some secure channel. The authors suggest distribut-
ing keys through a secure module such as a smart card.
5.3.2 Weaknesses
There are several weaknesses1 in this model.
• The framework is semi-oﬄine where the reader stores KV and KD. This puts a
limit on its utility for product authentication at consumer level, as KD cannot
be communicated to the consumer.
• KV and KD have to be delivered to a reader through some secure channel such as
a smart card. Since the same set of keys are distributed to each reader, this results
in a single point of failure where the loss of a single smart card will compromise
the entire system. Moreover, if a single retailer is dishonest, he can break the
entire system as all the readers use the same set of keys KV and KD.
1Contributed by Zeeshan Bilal, ISG, RHUL
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• The authors have not discussed the storage location and accessibility of KE inside
an EPC tag. If KE is stored at an accessible location, an attacker can make a
successful counterfeit tag by simply copying all the content of the EPC tag,
including KE , to a counterfeit tag. If KE is stored at some inaccessible location
inside the EPC tag, it can prevent tag cloning, but still the framework is prone
to single point of failure. Since KE is identical in each tag, it only needs an
adversary to attack a single tag to compromise the entire system.
• Bypass Attack. The framework is prone to a “Bypass” attack where the anti-
counterfeiting protocol is circumvented in a counterfeit tag in the following way.
The framework is designed to handle both WIPR-modified and standard EPC
tags. During the handshake protocol between a reader and an EPC tag, the tag
responds with an indication of being WIPR capable or not. This is achieved by
the modified tag sending a special WIPR EPC message to the reader instead
of the actual EPC value according to the standard (see Figure 4 in [12]). The
special WIPR message acts as a flag to the reader to execute the anti-counterfeit
protocol.
The framework does not provide integrity protection to the special WIPR EPC
message contents and so alterations to this message may not be detected. An
attacker just needs to replace this message with the actual EPC value in the
counterfeit tag, thereby making the tag claim to follow the standard EPC pro-
tocol. On receipt of the actual EPC value from a counterfeit tag, the reader
does not execute the anti-counterfeiting protocol, instead assuming the tag to be
unmodified as the flag (the special WIPR message) is not received from the tag.
Thus, the anti-counterfeit protocol is bypassed and the counterfeit tag remains
undetected. Of course, if the reader knows the TID belongs to a tag which follows
the WIPR modified protocol, then the counterfeit should be detected.
5.4 The Proposed Model
In this section, we propose a different anti-counterfeiting model that uses RFID tech-
nology to detect counterfeit products. This model is a modified version of the Alex
Arbit et al. model [12]. We add an NFC chip to the EPC tag, thereby providing a
product authentication mechanism to the consumer level.
NFC technology is used mainly for two reasons. Firstly, this technology can support
public key cryptography on tags and, secondly, it is available on cell phones enabling
them to act as RFID readers. The former supports our framework in an oﬄine mode
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Figure 5.2: Initialisation phase of the proposed scheme.
where a connection to the supplier’s database is no longer required. The latter helps
extend the authentication model to the consumer level, where a consumer uses his cell
phone to authenticate a product.
5.4.1 Initialisation Phase
Our new anti-counterfeit model is executed in two phases, the first, namely initializa-
tion, being illustrated in Fig. 5.2. This phase is initiated from the production line where
a serial number and an EPC are allocated to the product. The serial number, EPC
and the product specification are communicated to Tag Initiator (TI). Meanwhile, the
product is dispatched to the Tag Embedding department.
On receipt of the information from the production line, the TI generates a pub-
lic/private key pair (Kpub,Kpr). This pair is unique for each tagged product item. The
TI must be a secure platform as it is responsible for the generation of anti-counterfeit
keys. It stores the EPC in an EPC tag and forms a string S1 defined by
S1=EPC‖Product S/N‖Product Specification‖Kpub
The TI digitally signs this string S1 with his signing key Ksign and stores the
string along with its signature on the NFC tag. The signature on the tag is stored as
a ‘Signature Record’ according to NFC Forum’s Signature Record Type Definition [7].
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According to this specification, the signature record consists of a digital signature
along with a digital certificate containing the corresponding verification key Kver with
a hierarchical certificate chain as described in Chapter 2 §2.3.2. S1 and its signature
are stored at a memory location accessible to any NFC reader. However, the TI also
stores the secret key Kpr inside the tag but at a secure location. This location of Kpr
is only accessible to the tag’s processor and therefore inaccessible to a reader. The
corresponding public key Kpub is a part of S1, and therefore accessible to any NFC
reader. After storing the relevant information on both tags, the TI configures both
tags as write protected and dispatches them to the Tag Embedding department.
On receipt of the tags from the TI, the Tag Embedding department embeds both
tags on the product. Since the tags are physically embedded we shall assume that any
attempt to remove the tags will destroy them. After embedding the tags, the products
are shipped to the supply line, from whence they may be delivered to a department
store or direct to a consumer through online shopping.
5.4.2 Verification Phase
This phase is executed by the verifier on receipt of the product. Since this is an off-
line framework, the verifier does not require any connection to the supplier’s database.
Therefore the verifier may be a consumer, a warehouse employee, a member of law en-
forcement or indeed, any individual wishing to authenticate the product. The verifica-
tion phase is executed in two phases. The first is visual and the second is cryptographic.
The visual verification process is executed as follows:
• The consumer checks the claimed identity of the product itself and the integrity of
the tag which should be bound to the product item in a tamper-evident manner.
• The verifier places his cell phone on the NFC tag to read its contents. The accessi-
ble data on the NFC tag (string S1 and corresponding signature) is communicated
to the cell phone.
• The cell phone verifies the signature. A successful verification is an indication
that the string S1 is legitimate.
• The cell phone displays the product specification and its serial number to the
consumer.
• The consumer checks the two product descriptions match each other.
In the case of a successful visual verification, the consumer should initiate the second
phase of product verification, which is a cryptographic challenge-response protocol:
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• The cell phone sends a random challenge r to the NFC tag.
• The tag signs r with the secret key Kpr and returns the result sign(r) to the cell
phone.
• The cell phone verifies the signature using the corresponding verification key Kpub
which it knows from S1.
A successful verification is a strong indication of a genuine product, as a counterfeit
tag lacks the signing key Kpr and so cannot compute a valid signature on r.
The verification process also includes verification of the certificate chain stored in
the Signature record. The certificate chain does not store the top-most certificate (e.g.,
the root Certificate Authority certificate in an X.509 certificate chain), therefore the
cell phone needs to access it online, or through any other mean, if the root certificate
is not already stored in its memory. Additionally, the cell phone also needs to check
the validity of all certificates in the certificate chain for any revocation by visiting the
Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
5.5 Analysis
In this section, we analyse the proposed framework from various angles. Our model
addresses category 2 and 3 of counterfeits as mentioned in § 5.1.1. Categories 1 and 4
are not a focus of our work since, in the former case, the products are being identified by
the consumers as counterfeits and, in the latter, can be countered with an appropriate
quality control. Categories 2 and 3 are critical as the consumer is not aware of the
illegitimacy of the product. Since our model is designed to detect counterfeits at
the consumer level, it provides a tool for consumers to determine the legitimacy of a
product.
In the case of category 2 counterfeits where the original product is reverse engi-
neered, the NFC tag attached to the original product cannot be reverse engineered –
the secret data on the NFC tag cannot be copied as explained in § 4.5.5 and § 5.5.2. A
consumer can therefore determine the illegitimacy of a reverse-engineered product by
the unsuccessful verification of the data on the NFC tag.
In our model, the Tag Initiator (TI ) is responsible for generating and storing the
secret keys on the NFC tags. The tags are then embedded on the product by another
department termed the ‘Tag Embedding Department’. In the case of out-sourced man-
ufacturers, the product manufacturing and tag embedding are done by the out-sourced
manufacturer. The TI remains a part of the genuine owner and is not out-sourced or, if
it is, it is to a trusted partner only. The genuine owner provides NFC and EPC tags to
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the out-sourced manufacturer only in same quantity as specified in the contract. If an
out-sourced manufacturer is dishonest and produces more than the quantity mentioned
in the contract (category 3 counterfeits), he will have to produce the product either
without the NFC tag or with a fake NFC tag. This counterfeit product is then detected
by the consumer because making a fake NFC tag is too difficult (explained in § 5.5.2).
Of course, the consumer needs to be aware that the product is equipped with an NFC
tag and reject the product if it is absent. Thus, our model helps in the detection of
category 3 counterfeits at consumer level.
5.5.1 Justification for Two RFID Tags
We use two types of tags in our framework, an EPC tag and an NFC tag. Although
both are RFID tags, they have very different characteristics. The main difference is
the operating frequency: EPC tags operate at 860-960 MHz whereas NFC tags operate
at the 13.56 MHz frequency band. The range is consequently different in the two
tags. EPC tags can be read from 2 to 8 meters whereas NFC tags have a very short
communication range of no more than about 4 cm. This property makes only the EPC
tag suitable for supply chain management in order to remotely identify the products.
Since EPC tags are already deployed in the market for supply chain management, we
use EPC tags in our framework in order to maintain the backward compatibility and
normal supply chain needs.
NFC tags are used because two main requirements cannot be fulfilled by EPC tags.
Firstly, EPC tags are very resource constrained when compared to NFC tags: EPC
tags have very limited computational power and much less memory, whereas NFC
tags, especially NFC Type-4 tags, are much more powerful. Since our framework is
based on PKC and PKI, where the tag has to perform PKC, we need a reasonably
well-resourced tag. Secondly, our framework needs to provide authentication down to
the consumer level. Without an NFC tag, this would require every consumer to be
equipped with an EPC tag reader, which is currently far from practical. The issue is
resolved with the inclusion of the NFC tag, as the consumer’s cell phone can act as a
reader for the tag.
5.5.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse our framework from the security point of view. The goal
of an attacker is to develop a clone tag or a tag with a valid signature. To develop a
clone tag, the attacker must know the private key Kpr of the original tag. This key
is stored at an inaccessible location in the tag’s memory and so it is normally secure
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from the attacker. The alternative solution open to an attacker with a cloned tag is to
replace the legitimate public key Kpub with the attacker’s public key K
′
pub in S1 and
store the corresponding private key K ′pr in the tag. However, this is not possible as the
legitimate Kpub is digitally signed (it is in a digital certificate) so that any alteration
will invalidate the signature. Of course, the verifier must have a trusted source for the
certificate’s verification key in order not to be duped. Since our framework is based on
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), it inherits the complexity issues, such as certificate
management, certificate revocation etc of the PKI. For instance, the user needs to
access the Certificate Revocation List online whenever it needs to verify a certificate
chain.
In case an attacker spends time and money to reverse engineer or penetrate a single
tag and recover its private key Kpr, it will not affect the entire system as the pair
Kpr,Kpub is unique to each tag. The tags, being cheap, will have few counter-measures
to side channel analysis, which will be a sufficient threat in some markets. However,
this will avoid a single point of failure as experienced in Alex et al model.
Our framework is resistant to the bypass attack. The existence of Kpub in S1 is an
indication that the tag is equipped with the anti-cloning feature. This key can neither
be removed nor altered as it is digitally signed. The user’s application on the cell
phone, once it has detected Kpub, will execute the anti-counterfeiting protocol, thereby
resisting the bypass attack.
In addition to cryptographic authentication, our framework also provides visual
product authentication. After scanning the NFC tag, the product specification and
product serial number is visually displayed on the user’s cell phone display. The user
can visually check and verify the information from the product or product packaging.
Needless to say, there are many other sources of compromise. For example, the NFC
tag could just return a QR code which connects the consumer’s phone to the attacker’s
website and displays the expected protocol output and the verification data for the
counterfeit product. Alternatively, the merchant may direct customers who lack the
verification app to the attacker’s website to download a compromised app that confirms
the authenticity of any product.
The tags have to be tamper-evident. This is to ensure that they cannot be re-
used on counterfeit products. If the tag were to contain the URL for registering the
product under the manufacturer’s guarantee, customers could be encouraged by their
app to register, the manufacturer could check its database for duplicate registrations
that would flag a clone, and the manufacturer could advise the consumer if there were
such a problem.
One critical factor in securing the system is the physical location of the NFC tag in
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the product. This is an industry specific decision and requires careful consideration. It
is assumed that the tags are physically embedded on the main assembly of the product
and not on casing/packing or on any easily replaceable component of the product, very
much in the same way as a watermark or hologram is an integral part of the item it
is protecting. As in the latter case, an attacker just needs to place the tag embedded
component from a legitimate product into the counterfeit product.
5.5.3 Mobile Phone Security
Mobile phones are never considered as trusted platforms. They are vulnerable to various
types of viruses, worms, trojans, rootkits and botnets [42]. They are also used as
attacking platforms for data skimming, relays attacks and card emulators. This implies
that a compromised mobile device may not give the desired output in our scheme.
For instance, a malicious application running on a compromised mobile device in our
scheme may always display a genuine product of some specific brand, irrespective of
the legitimacy of the product. Additionally, the customer must download the product
verification application from a trustworthy source. Otherwise, there are chances that a
malware gets downloaded in the mobile device undermining the product authentication
mechanism. Needless to say that the genuine downloaded application must be protected
against known attacks.
5.5.4 Economic Analysis
This section analyses economic aspects of the proposed scheme at a broader level.
The inclusion of NFC tags in addition to EPC tags for product identification re-
quires some additional investment by the supplier. For simplicity, we assume the ad-
ditional costs associated with generating keys, signing certificates, writing to the tags,
embedding the tags, etc., is already included in the cost of the NFC tag. We also as-
sume that the cost of an item is independent of the number of such items made, which
is plainly rather na¨ıve.
We only consider loss in the sales revenue because of counterfeit products. The true
loss is much higher and not just financial. There are various other important aspects
such as loss in distinctiveness of brand image, gradual decline in sales, unemployment
etc., but inclusion of these factors complicates the analysis too much – our goal is
merely to justify the cost of our anti-counterfeiting scheme.
Let x be the production cost/unit and y the selling price/unit, ∆ = y − x the
profit/unit, n the market demand over some fixed period and pi the initial percentage
of counterfeits in the market (i.e. prior to implementation of our framework).
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We assume that our scheme does not fully eliminate counterfeits from the market.
This assumption is based on two factors. Firstly, not all the consumers will touch their
mobile phones with NFC tags to determine the legitimacy of the product. Some may
not even know about it, and some may ignore this procedure. Secondly, a compromised
mobile device may not detect a counterfeit product as explained in §5.5.3. So, we expect
that after implementation of our scheme by a product manufacturer, some counterfeit
products will still be in the market. We denote the percentage of counterfeit product
after implementation of our scheme as final percentage, pf .
Similarly, we denote the initial financial gain Gi and final financial gain Gf for a
company before and after implementation of our framework respectively.
Suppose, by observing his sales, the original manufacturer is able to make exactly
the number of products he can sell, namely n(1− pi). The remaining market share of
npi consists of counterfeits from other suppliers. The Gi by the original manufacturer
is n ·∆ · (1− pi) compared with an ideal profit of n ·∆ if he were to supply the whole
market.
Let c be the unit cost of implementing RFID tags on a product. This cost includes
all associated costs regarding RFID implementation as mentioned earlier. If no price
increase is allowed, the final financial gain Gf generated under these conditions is:
Gf = n · (∆− c)(1− pf )
This represents an increase providing Gf > Gi, i.e.
n · (∆− c)(1− pf ) > n ·∆ · (1− pi) (5.1)
The initial percentage pi of counterfeit products depends on various factors like
brand, geographical location, in-store or on-line, product price etc. It is difficult for
any agency, other than the product manufacturer itself, to find an exact value of pi for a
specific brand as the counterfeit products of categories 2, 3 and 4 are indistinguishable.
This may be the reason behind the large variation in the estimate of counterfeit products
by the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce
(7% counterfeits), and the surveys carried out by some product manufacturers like
Dior, Vuitton, Tiffany & Co., on eBay (about 90% counterfeits) as described in § 5.1.
Assuming both these figures to be true, they illustrate that the percentage of the
counterfeits products pi varies from very low level to high level.
Similarly, the value of pf is hard to predict with a reasonable accuracy. We claim
that our scheme will decrease the percentage of counterfeits, but by how much? The
answer depends on various factors like pi, consumer awareness, availability of a smart
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phones and corresponding mobile phone application to the consumers, and most im-
portantly, the methodology of determining pf by a brand. For simplicity, we say that
the pf = m · pi, where 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. To get a rough estimate of the economic feasibility
of our model, we analyse it under following four values of m:
• m = 0.25 (counterfeits are decreased by 75%)
• m = 0.50 (counterfeits are decreased by 50%)
• m = 0.75 (counterfeits are decreased by 25%)
• m = 0.90 (counterfeits are decreased only by 10%)
Assuming the price of implementing RFID tags with the required infrastructure is







The plot of Equation (5.2) is shown in figure 5.3 with above-mentioned four different
values of m. The shaded region in the figure represents the suitability of trying to












Figure 5.3: Suitability of Economic Model (c = $5)
Table 5.1 describes the minimum profit/unit (rounded to nearest Dollar) for the
extreme values of pi (7% and 90%) against the four assumed values of m.
This analysis is based on very straightforward assumptions and may not represent
the reality. For instance, we assumed that the product cost is not related to the number
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Table 5.1: Minimum Profit/Unit, ∆, above which our model is likely to be feasible
of items being produced, which is far away from practicality. Similarly, loses apart from
sales revenue, for example, damaged brand value and firm reputation, health and safety
risks due to sub-standard products and its concerning financial effects, loses in Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), cost of legal actions taken against counterfeiters and pirates,
cost on investigations to detect counterfeits in a market, etc., are also not considered
in our model. Moreover, there may not be a linear relationship between pf and pi
in a practical scenario. Addition of these factors in economic analysis makes it more
complicated, that we don’t want to – our goal is only to focus on the financial effects of
our model at a broader level. This simple analysis represents that our model becomes
more suitable for the markets facing high number of counterfeits. For a market with
low percentage of counterfeits, our model is suitable for only high cost items. On the
other hand, for a market with high percentage of counterfeits, our model is suitable
for even low cost products. Although product manufacturers are very much aware of
profit/unit of their products; they must have a reasonable data of counterfeit products
in the market in order to decide about implementation of our model.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper presents an RFID based anti-counterfeiting framework at the consumer
level. There are two main constraints related to this authentication level. Firstly,
the typical individual consumer cannot afford to keep an RFID reader to authenticate
a product; and secondly, customers cannot be provided with access to the supplier’s
database because of privacy issues. We addressed both these constraints by using NFC
technology: an NFC tag is used along with an EPC tag for consumer level authentic-
ation on the reasonable assumption that most individuals will carry an NFC-enabled
mobile phone in the near future. We provided a dual layer verification mechanism to
a consumer. In the first phase of verification, the product specifications are displayed
to the consumer on his cell phone for visual verification against the actual product.
After successful verification, a cryptographic challenge-response protocol is executed
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to authenticate the product. Our proposal is based in PKC and PKI and successfully
detects the counterfeit products. Analysis shows that the proposed framework is likely
to be feasible for low-cost products with a profit/unit above about $6 for the markets
facing high volume of counterfeits, whereas, our model is suitable for only high cost
product (profit/unit above $94) for the markets with fewer counterfeits under some
straightforward assumptions. These values may not represent the reality, as many
other side-effects of counterfeits are not considered, just to keep our analysis simple.
Once a tag is registered against a specific user , then tag authentication leads to
user authentication. In the next chapter, we will describe a payment framework, where




An NFC Payment Framework
This chapter provides a mobile transaction framework. The work is pub-
lished in the Eighth International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Comput-
ing, Systems, Services and Technologies (UBICOMM) [60]. §6.4 and §6.5
are almost verbatim of the published work. §6.2 is contributed by Pardis
Pourghomi and Gheorghita Ghinea (both from Brunel University, Uxbridge,
Middlesex).
6.1 Introduction
One of the main use of NFC technology in future is mobile payments. At a broader
level, the mobile payment comprises of two parts: user authentication and transaction
execution. NFC, being a relatively new technology, has yet to mature in this domain
as still there is no standardised framework for monetary transaction using NFC. In
this chapter, we propose an NFC based payment solution. The Mobile Network Op-
erator (MNO) of the user performs the transaction on behalf of the user. The MNO
first authenticates the user, and after successful authentication, the MNO performs
transaction. The authentication of the user is carried out through the mobile device,
which follows a different approach from the authentication frameworks described in
earlier chapters of the thesis. The reason is the existence of a shared secret key Ki be-
tween the mobile device and the MNO. This is an online tag authentication (described
in Chapter 4, §4.2.1) which complements our earlier proposed off-line authentication
framework in chapter 4. We used GSM authentication parameters in our approach not
only to authenticate the user, but also to encrypt the communication channel. Our
work in this chapter is a step towards making NFC a tool for mobile commerce in
future.
87
6.2. Mobile Commerce Using NFC 6. An NFC Payment Framework
6.2 Mobile Commerce Using NFC
Mobile Commerce, also known as m-commerce, is the ability to conduct commerce
using a mobile device, such as a mobile phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a
smartphone, or other emerging mobile equipment such as dashtop mobile devices. The
use of m-commerce has seen rapid growth in recent years, with several different services
like Short Message Service (SMS), Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), Unstructured
Supplementary Service Data (USSD) and K-Java on the GSM network and NFC [21].
NFC technology over mobile devices has given a new direction to m-commerce.
With NFC technology, mobile phones can have additional functionality to act as a
contactless card to be used as an easy method of payment. However, there are con-
cerns such as personalization, data storage, management and ownership of the Secure
Element (SE) as it stores sensitive data such as banking credentials. The trust among
various key players, such as MNO, mobile device manufacturers, banks, SIM manu-
facturers etc, is the key for a successful mobile transaction framework. NFC, being a
relatively new technology, is yet to mature to be widely used in m-commerce.
Alpa´r et al. introduced Tap2 technology where the users need only their NFC-
enabled mobile devices and credentials implemented on their smart cards [10]. They
proposed the use of NFC technology in the on-line banking solution based on EMV Chip
Authentication Program (EMV-CAP). Gerald Madlmayr and Josef Langer presented
a purse-based micro-payment system [46]. They designed a pre-paid wallet where the
money is stored in the Secure Element in the mobile device. The user can top-up their
account Over-The-Air (OTA), anywhere and anytime.
W. Chen et al. proposed an authentication and transaction protocol that utilizes the
existing GSM network for customer authentication and monetary transaction [21]. The
protocol first authenticates a customer who wants to pay for some services. He uses his
mobile phone for payment and the respective MNO transfers funds from his account
to the shop account. The same researchers proposed another transaction protocol
that combines the existing 3G cryptographic primitives and algorithms, in addition
to the identification and authentication of the customer, with the NFC technology to
implement a mobile payment system [22].
Inspired by this approach, we proposed two separate solutions with a similar pat-
tern, i.e., the MNO is responsible for transferring funds from a customer to a shop. We
name these versions Protocol Version I and Version II.
We will describe some salient features of the Version I in § 6.3. This will be followed
by its improved version, Version II in § 6.4.
Before going into the details of our work, we would like to provide an overview of
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Figure 6.1: Generation of Kc and S from R.
the GSM authentication and advantages to a cloud-based SE.
6.2.1 GSM Authentication
When a mobile device signs into a network, the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) first
authenticates the device (specifically the SIM). The authentication stage verifies the
identity and validity of the SIM and ensures that the subscriber has authorized access
to the network. The Authentication Centre (AuC) of the MNO is responsible for
authenticating each SIM that attempts to connect to the GSM core network through a
Mobile Switching Centre (MSC). The AuC stores two encryption algorithms, A3 and
A8, as well as a list of all subscriber identities along with their corresponding secret
keys Ki. The key Ki is also stored in the SIM. The AuC first generates a random
number, denoted by R. This is used to generate two responses: a signed response S
and a key Kc as shown in Figure 6.1, where S = EA3,Ki(R) uses the A3 encryption
algorithm and Kc = EA8,Ki(R) uses the A8 encryption algorithm [1].
(R,S,Kc) is known as the Authentication triplet generated by the AuC. The AuC
sends this triplet to the MSC. On receiving a triplet, the MSC forwards its first element
R to the mobile device. The mobile device SIM computes the expected response S from
R, using A3 and the key Ki which is stored in the SIM. The mobile device transmits
S to the MSC. If this S matches the S in the triplet, then the mobile is authenticated.
Kc is then used for communication encryption between the mobile device and the Base
Station (BS).
6.2.2 Conventional Payment Structures
A conventional payment structure consist of following main entities (as shown in Fig-
ure 6.2). The role of each entity is described in [29].
• Card and Card Holder: It is the end product user; the one who possesses a
payment card and to whom the card is issued.
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• Merchant: It is the entity which accepts payments from a card holder in ex-
change for goods and/or services and connects to a payment network through an
acquirer.
• Acquirer: It is a third-party service provider that acquires and processes pay-
ment transactions for merchants, manages the relationship with the global and
regional payment networks on the merchants behalf and manages the transaction
database. The acquirer connects merchant transactions to payment networks by:
– Providing the POS device to the merchants
– Securely routing transaction from POS device to the payment network
– Managing transactions from authorization to clearing to settlement.
• Issuer: This is the financial institution which issues a card to a cardholder and
holds the account or credit line behind the card. It performs many activities that
could include:
– Cardholder customer service
– Data preparation
– Configuration set-up
– Fulfilment of personalized chip card, with all paper inserts; preparation for
mailing to customer
– Define card profile, including risk parameters
– Receive and manage card records and keys to form a personalization record
– Generate personalization script
– Key management activities for EMV, CVV/CVC, and PINs between card
manufacturer and personalization bureau and between issuer and personal-
ization bureau
6.2.3 Advantages of the Cloud-Based Approach
Our NFC cloud-based approach is based on managing and accessing sensitive trans-
action data by storing the data in a cloud rather than in the mobile phone. When
a transaction is carried out, the required data is retrieved from a remote virtual SE
which is stored within the cloud environment. The mobile phone SE provides temp-
orary storage and authentication assets for the transaction to take place.
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Figure 6.2: A conventional Payment Structure
An issue with SEs is that companies have to meet the requirements of organizations
such as EMVco to provide high level security in order to store personal data [54].
This makes the SE expensive for companies. However, a cloud-based approach would
transfer this cost. Then the SE in the NFC phone is only responsible for user/device
authentication and not for storing personal data. This improves the cost efficiency of the
SE compared with the present, enabling many more secure applications to be supported
because of the reduced pressure on space. Also, the NFC controller chips could be
smaller and cheaper as they no longer have to support all previous functionality.
The NFC cloud-based approach makes business simpler for companies in terms of
the integration of SE card provisioning. It would be much easier for businesses to
implement NFC services without having to perform card provisioning for every single
SE. The NFC phone user will be able to access many more applications as they are no
longer stored in a physical SE. In terms of flexibility, all users would be able to access
all their applications from all their devices (e.g. phones, tablets or laptops) since the
applications are stored in a cloud environment that provides a single, shared, secure,
storage space. Moreover, fraud detection would be instantaneous as the system runs
only in a fully online mode.
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6.3 The Protocol Version I
The Version uses a cloud architecture where the cloud is being managed by the MNO.
The MNO first authenticates a customer through an improved an improved GSM auth-
entication and after a successful authentication, transfers the required amount to the
shop. Its main features include:
• Mutual authentication of the mobile device and the MNO using existing GSM
primitives
• PIN verification
• Multiple accounts against a single customer
• Pay-as-you-go and pre-paid accounts for payments
• Non-repudiation of transaction messages by using digital signatures
This work is published in the International Journal of Advanced Computer Science
and Applications (IJACSA) [56].
6.4 The Protocol Version II
The major improvement in the Version II is the elimination of the shared secret be-
tween the shop PoS terminal and the customer MNO, a prerequisite in the Version I.
Therefore, the shop does not need to get itself registered with the customer MNO to
perform mobile transactions. This makes the Version II more flexible and it can even
be used for monetary transfer between two individuals provided that the payer has
registered an account with his MNO.
Additionally, we also eliminate the requirement of secure channels among various
entities of the MNO. We suggest a dedicated department, MNO Transaction Depart-
ment (MTD) to manage the monetary transactions. The user provides his bank card
details to the MTD for pay-as-you-go transactions, or top-up his account for pre-paid
transactions. The registered bank card is not required to be physically present during
transaction, so our model falls under Card Not Present (CNP) category. The MTD
in our model is analogous to acquirer in conventional payment structure. It acts as a
third party responsible for monetary transaction. The issuer is the financial entity (e.g.,
bank) that issues bank card to card holders for pay-as-you-go transactions, whereas,
for pre-paid transactions, it is subsumed by the MTD. The latter facilitates those in-
dividuals who do not have their bank accounts but they need to pay for services. A
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virtual secure tunnel is established between the mobile device and the MTD to ensure
the security of the messages. The virtual tunnel is of special significance when the Base
Station of some other network is used for the transaction; as in such scenario, the MNO
responsible for monetary transaction does not want to reveal any sensitive information
to the Base Station.
The Version II has many similarities with the Version I. The Secure Element (SE)
is partitioned into two sections; one stored in the SIM for customer authentication and
the other stored in a cloud, managed by the MTD, to hold customer’s account details.
A customer, who is a user of a cell phone, opens up a payment account with the
respective MNO prior to use the proposed payment feature. Each account is identified
by a unique identity, the Account ID or AccID. The account is either a pre-paid or a
pay-as-you-go account. A customer can have one or more accounts of either type and
has the option to select one account while payment.
In contrast to the Version I, the mobile device communicates with the MNO over
the standard GSM link. The shop communicates with the customer MNO through
the customer’s mobile device using NFC and the GSM link. Communication over the
GSM link between the mobile device and the Base Station is encrypted as specified in
the GSM standard. Otherwise, communication between different entities of the GSM
network is not considered to be secure and so encryption needs to be added where
appropriate. The MNO may be linked to the customer’s mobile device through its own
BS or through a BS of some other network. Especially in the latter case, the proposed
protocol should not disclose any sensitive information to the other network. The shop
PoS terminal does not require to be registered with the MNO. This makes monetary
transactions between two individuals possible (the payer and the payee are analogous
to the customer and the shop respectively).
The customer’s cell phone is equipped with an application installed in the SIM that
provides all required functionalities and a user interface for transactions. For simplicity,
we refer to the cell phone and the SIM as a single unit, the ‘Mobile Device’ (MD). The
authentication of the customer by the MNO is derived from the GSM authentication.
The shop PoS terminal and the customer’s MD, both need to obtain and store
trusted certificates for the keys of the MTDs they are willing to trust. Ksign,Kver are
the signing and verification keys respectively of the MTD, whereas Kpr,Kpub are the
private decryption and public encryption keys respectively of the MTD.
The protocol executes in three different phases: customer identification and credit
check, customer authentication, and transaction execution. Steps of the protocol are
illustrated in Fig. 6.3, with numbering as in the text.
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3.1 PIN Verification
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10. Verify Response S
13.1 Decrypt with K1
13.2 Signature Verification
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4. EKpub (K1‖K2), EK1 (Crreq),MACK2 [EK1 (Crreq)]





12. EK1 (Crapp), Sig
14. Crapp, Sig
16. EKpub (Kinfo), EK3 (Banking Details), MACK4 [EK3 (Banking Details)]
18. EK1 (TEMu), Sig
19. EK3 (TEMs), Sig
Figure 6.3: The Proposed Customer Authentication & Payment Protocol
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6.4.1 Phase I: Customer Identification and Credit Check
This phase is initiated when the store owner sends the payment request to his NFC
reader and the customer places his MD on the shop’s NFC enabled point.
Step 1: The MD and shop terminal establish an NFC connection.
Step 2: The shop terminal forms the Payment Information message PI containing
at least the Total Price TP , a temporary shop identity TSID, and the shop’s Time
Stamp TSs, and sends it to the MD:
PI = TP‖TSID‖TSs (6.1)
The TSID acts as one time identifier used by the shop to identify the transaction. It
is updated and fresh for each transaction. Optionally, PI may also contain a description
of the shop and the goods which would appear on the customer’s credit/debit card
account statement.
Steps 3-4: Once the payment information is received from the shop, the application
installed on the MD displays the transaction amount TP to the user and asks him to
select a payment account and provide PIN authentication. This is for assurance that
the customer is the legal owner of the mobile device, and therefore also the owner of
the account which will be used for payment. It also provides confirmation that the
amount and account details are accepted by the user.
After successful PIN verification, the MD needs to obtain a credit approval certifi-
cate for the shop from the respective MTD indicating that the customer has sufficient
funds in his account and has agreed to pay the required amount. The information in
this exchange should not be accessible to the BS or any other entity of GSM network
other than the MTD. To provide a secure connection for this exchange between the MD
and the MTD, the mobile device generates two keys K1,K2 for symmetric encryption
and MAC respectively. The actual encryption process used here is irrelevant, but will
most likely be specified by the card provider and EMV requirements. It should not
depend only on quantities known to either the BS or the MNO since only the MTD
should be able to perform the decryption. The mobile device forms a credit request
message Crreq for credit approval from the MTD, namely,
Crreq = PI‖IMSI‖AccID (6.2)
This is encrypted with K1 and a MAC is computed on the ciphertext using K2
to provide data integrity. Then the keys, K1 and K2, are encrypted with the MTD’s
public key Kpub. The entire message, consisting of the encrypted keys, the encrypted
credit request and the MAC value, is sent to the MTD as in message 4 of Figure 6.3.
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Step 5: Upon receipt of this message, the MTD starts by decrypting the first part
of the message with its private key Kpr to extract the encryption and MAC keys, K1
and K2. It then verifies the MAC and in case of successful verification, it decrypts the
second part of the message, containing Crreq, and checks the freshness of the shop’s
time stamp in PI. The MTD identifies the customer from the IMSI in Crreq and
performs a credit check against the named account AccID.
6.4.2 Phase II: Customer Authentication
Steps 6-11: Whether or not the credit and freshness checks are successful, the MTD
sends an authentication request message to the MSC/AuC to authenticate the MD.
The MD has already been identified by its IMSI. However, since the IMSI is not a
secret, it may be used by a malicious party. To counter such threat, the MD needs to
be authenticated under the IMSI claimed in Crreq prior to any monetary transaction.
With this IMSI, the MSC follows the usual procedure to authenticate an MD and it
does not required further user interaction. So, in the case of successful authentication,
the usual success message is sent from the BS to the MTD.
Step 12: If the credit check fails or the authentication success message is not
received, the protocol is terminated with the sending of a fail message from the MTD
to the MD. Termination does not occur before the authentication in order to hide the
result of the credit check from an unauthenticated attacker. Otherwise, when both the
credit check and the authentication are successful, a credit approval identifier AppID
is generated by the MTD. This acts as an index to a table in which the MTD stores
information about the debit account, the amount to be transferred, the destination shop
identity, a time stamp and the MD identity (IMSI). This identifier helps in resolving
any disputes in the future but the details of the transaction are not contained therein.
The MTD now forms a new string Crapp indicating credit approval for the Payment
Information PI, namely,
Crapp = PI‖TSa‖AppID (6.3)
where TSa is the MTD’s approval time stamp.
The MTD computes a signature with its signing key Ksign over the hashed plaintext
and encrypts the string Crapp with the key K1. The encrypted Crapp along with its
signature is transmitted to the mobile device. The former cannot be decrypted in
transit as the encryption key K1 is unavailable, nor is Crapp revealed by applying the
verification key to the signature because of the hashing. Moreover, because of TSs,
TSa or AppID, the message differs each time even if the user buys the same goods on
successive occasions.
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Steps 13-16: The mobile device decrypts the message with the encryption key K1
to obtain Crapp and forwards it to the shop along with the corresponding signature.
The shop verifies the signature using Kver and compares the PI content in the Crapp
message to the one it initially sent in message 2. In the case of an invalid signature or a
mis-match with PI, the shop discards the message, rejects the payment, and withholds
the goods or services from the customer. A successful verification indicates that the
customer is legitimate and that the MTD has obtained agreement from the customer
to pay. This is like a three party contract where a middle party (the MTD), trusted
by both other parties, provides assurance that the other party is willing to pay the
specified price.
The shop now needs to send its banking details to the MTD to complete the trans-
action. The banking details may include the account name and number, the bank and
branch codes, etc. This is sensitive information and should not be disclosed to any
entity other than the MTD, not even to the MD. The shop therefore generates encryp-
tion and MAC keys, K3 and K4 to secure its banking details. It encrypts the banking
details with the key K3, and computes a MAC over the ciphertext with the key K4. It
also forms a string, Kinfo, containing the information about the keys as follows:
Kinfo = K3‖K4‖AppID (6.4)
The role of the approval identifier AppID in this step is to enable the MTD to
connect the authentication phase to the transaction execution phase. The shop encrypts
the string Kinfo with the public key Kpub of the MTD and sends it to the MTD via
the MD. This forms a virtual tunnel between the shop and the MTD through the MD,
as the latter cannot decrypt the message content. Note, however, that the shop needs
to be certain it has Kpub correctly from the MTD, and not a key substituted by an
attacker.
6.4.3 Phase III: Transaction Execution
Step 17: The MTD associates the AppID received in the step 16 with the already
stored AppID (step 12). It decrypts the banking details of the shop with keys K3, K4
and transfers the approved amount, stored against corresponding AppID, to the shop
account. The MTD flags the AppID indicating that the transaction has been executed
to ensure that the same AppID could not be used again.
Step 18-21 After a successful transaction, the MTD generates a Transaction Serial
Number (TSN) and forms Transaction Execution Messages, TEMu and TEMs for the
MD and the shop respectively.
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TSN = Transaction serial Number
TStr = Time Stamp (transaction)
SBAD = Shop Bank Account Details
The MTD computes a signature on the hashed plaintext, encrypts TEMu with
the key K1, and sends it to the MD. The MD decrypts the message and verifies the
signature. An invalid signature indicates that the transaction confirmation has been
accidentally or deliberately corrupted en route. In such a case, the MD enquires about
the transaction from the MTD. If the transaction has already been executed, the MD
asks for a fresh confirmation message. Otherwise, it is obvious that message 16 has
not been delivered to the MTD. This may happen if a malicious party has blocked
the message from reaching the MTD and has instead transmitted a fake transaction
confirmation message. Of course, such a fabricated message cannot go undetected as
it is signed by the MTD. In such scenario, the MD asks the shop to resend message 16.
The MTD also forms a Transaction Execution Message, TEMs, for the shop by
appending the Shop’s Banking Details as shown in Eq (6.5). The MTD computes a
signature over the hashed plaintext and encrypts TEMs with the key K3. The MTD
sends this encrypted message along with its signature to the customer MD which relays
it to the shop. The customer’s MD can neither decrypt this message as it does not
possess K3, nor alter any contents as they are protected by the signature. The shop
decrypts the message, verify its contents and the signature, thereby confirming that his
account (rather than an attacker’s) has been credited correctly. The contents consist
of important transaction information exchanged during the transaction. Hence, if the
shop wants any subsequent clarification, it can approach the MNO quoting the TSN
and the AppID received in step 14. Finally, if the shop is satisfied, it produces a receipt
together with the goods or services for the customer.
6.5 Analysis
In this section, we analyse the protocol from multiple perspectives to ascertain the
strength of our protocol. This analysis encompasses the authentication and security of
the messages. We assume that the MNO is trustworthy, whereas the customer or the
shop can be dishonest, and there may be an active attacker listening to any of the NFC
or other messages.
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6.5.1 Dishonest Customer
Scenario 1. A dishonest customer plans to buy some products, making the payment
from someone else’s account. The PIN requirement in step 3 should force the customer
to use his own mobile device to enact the protocol. Indeed the protocol depends on the
strength of this PIN, just as is the case with credit card withdrawals. However, rogue
applications on the MD could have already sniffed the PIN.
Assume that the attacker uses his own mobile and knows the IMSI and account
numbers (IMSI ′, Acc′ID) of the target victim. He must fabricate Eq (6.2) as:
Cr′req = PI‖IMSI ′‖Acc′ID (6.6)
As this message can be decrypted only by the MTD, the malicious contents remain
undetected by all other entities. The MTD decrypts the message and identifies the
customer from IMSI ′. Assuming the protocol does not fail here because the target
victim is not a legitimate customer or the account has insufficient funds, the MTD
proceeds to the fresh authentication of IMSI ′. So the MSC/AuC provides the auth-
entication triplet in step 7 corresponding to IMSI ′. However, the attacker cannot
compute the valid response S′ as his mobile device lacks the necessary key K ′i. So,
the authentication check fails and the protocol terminates. Thus, an incorrect identity
cannot be successfully used in the protocol.
Scenario 2. Suppose a dishonest customer plans to buy goods without payment.
He could accomplish this by providing his own banking details, instead of the shop’s,
to the MTD for the payment recipient. He then blocks the legitimate message 16,
and replaces it as follows. Using his own keys K ′3 and K ′4, he fabricates message 16
with own banking details and sends it to the MTD. The MTD performs the transaction
against this information, deducting the amount from the customer’s account but paying
it back into the same or another account of the customer. (These may be distinct in an
attempt to avoid detection). After executing the transaction, the MTD sends ‘receipts’
in messages 18 and 19. The MD must block message 19 as this message contains the
substituted bank details which the shop checks. So the dishonest customer needs to
replace the banking details in this message with the shop’s banking details. He can
decrypt message 19 as it is encrypted with his own malicious key K ′3. However, he
must now change the banking details and encrypt them with the shop’s key K3. As he
lacks this key, he cannot generate a valid ciphertext. Moreover, the original message is
protected by the digital signature. If the customer were to make any alteration to the
banking details, it would void the signature which the shop verifies next. In neither
case is the shop able to verify the transaction, and a failure message is reported to the
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shopkeeper. Hence, the dishonest customer is again unsuccessful.
There may be another approach to accomplish the above attack where the dishonest
customer plans to buy some goods without payment. The dishonest customer does
not communicate with the MTD since he could not succeed in the way described
above; rather, he masquerades as the MTD to the shop. The target of the customer
is to send fake but acceptable receipts to the shop at the end of the protocol by
replaying old legitimate, messages or fabricating new messages. Since the customer
is not communicating with the MTD, his account will not be debited. In the original
protocol, the shop receives three messages from the MD: messages 1, 14 and 19. Message
1 originates from the MD, whereas messages 14 and 19 actually originate from the MTD
but are relayed by the MD to the shop. The dishonest customer needs to construct
or replay the latter two messages in such a way that they are acceptable to the shop.
Both messages are digitally signed by the MTD. They contain the Shop Identifier TSID
and Time Stamp TSs. TSID is a random value generated by the shop every time at
the start of the protocol. This value not only serves as a shop identifier during the
protocol, but it also adds freshness to the protocol messages. TSs is updated too in
every protocol round, but it may be predictable to some extent. A combination of
these two values, along with the digital signatures of the MTD, does not allow either
replay or alteration of the messages to succeed. Hence, the dishonest customer is again
unsuccessful. Of course, as usual in PKI, the shop should check the digital certificates
of the MTD keys to justify its trust in them.
Scenario 3. Assume now that the dishonest customer plans to pay less than
the required amount but claim payment of the full amount. To accomplish this, the
MD sends TP ′ in the Credit Request message Crreq of step 4 to the MTD, where
TP ′<TP . The MD receives the Credit Approval message, Crapp, in step 12 from
the MTD confirming that the initially requested amount TP ′ has been approved for
transaction. But the MD needs to confirm to the shop in step 14 that the original
amount, TP , is approved for transaction. Since the approved price is digitally signed
by the MTD, it cannot be amended by the MD. So the actual price that is approved
by the MTD is transmitted to the shop. As the shop application checks the approved
amount against that requested, this attack also fails.
Scenario 4. Here, a dishonest customer wants to pay through a mobile device
which he does not own. He might have stolen that device or found it as lost property.
If the SIM is still valid and the credit/debit cards have not been cancelled, it can
still be used for transactions. After the device receives the payment information PI
from the shop in step 2, the application installed on the mobile device requires PIN
verification from the customer. Since the customer does not own the mobile device,
100
6.5. Analysis 6. An NFC Payment Framework
he should not have knowledge of the PIN. So the protocol does not proceed further.
Additionally, the application can be designed to be blocked in the MD and by the
MTD after a limited number of failed attempts at PIN verification. This provides an
assurance to the customers that their lost mobile device could not be used for any
monetary transactions even while the SIM remains active.
6.5.2 A Dishonest Shop
Scenario 5. The shop is dishonest and plans to draw more than the required amount
without intimation to the customer. The information about the amount to be trans-
ferred is sent to the MTD by the MD in the Credit Request message, Crreq, in step 4.
A mobile device cannot send more than the price contained in PI and approved by the
user in step 3 unless the device itself is compromised. Therefore, a shop cannot obtain
more than the agreed amount if, as requested, the customer checks the amount before
entering his PIN.
Scenario 6. The shop is dishonest and denies receipt of the transaction execution
message in step 19. In this way, the shop decides not to deliver the goods or services
despite receiving the required amount. However, the MD has the signed receipt from
the MTD with the TSN from Eq (6.5). This is linked to the approval AppID generated
in step 12. As both are digitally signed by the MTD, the customer can approach
the MTD regarding any dispute. With knowledge of the account credited during the
transaction and the shop receipt from the customer, the MTD can take action to
identify the criminal and refund the customer.
6.5.3 Message Security
Apart from the above-mentioned scenarios, we also analysed our protocols from various
other angles. The data over the GSM link (between the MD and the BS) is encrypted
according to the GSM specification. The data sent over the NFC link in steps 1, 2
and 14 are sent in the clear. This data does not contain any particularly sensitive
information except perhaps for the TP. However, the range within which this data can
be captured is very limited, and it is occupied by the shop keeper and the customer, at
least one of whom should notice unwelcome devices (such as other NFC capable mobile
phones) in the vicinity. The read range of the price displayed on both the shop till and
the user’s MD is much more than the range of the NFC link. Therefore, we considered
PI as not sufficiently sensitive to need protection over the NFC link. Nevertheless, we
should consider this in a little more detail.
Other information that is sent in clear over the NFC link includes the AppID in
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the Crapp message. At this point the attacker can hi-jack the protocol by blocking
the communication of message 16, replacing it with his own forged message which
contains his own bank details. There is no relevant data which is not known to the
attacker. This results in a successful transfer of funds to the criminal and also a
successful acknowledgment in step 18 to the legitimate customer. However, the shop
owner will either not receive the transfer message in step 20, or will receive one which
fails his verification. Thus, although the shop keeper will not then release the goods,
the attacker will have obtained the funds. The solution is to include a means for the
MTD to verify that message 18 comes from the same source as message 2.
We therefore propose the inclusion of a Diffie-Hellman key agreement (DH) between
the MD and Shop during messages 1 & 2 in situations where the NFC link may be
compromised. Then step 18 can include a proof of origin. Step 1 would include the
public parameters for DH, and the MD’s exponentiated value, while step 2 would
include the shop’s response of the other DH exponentiated value. As message 16
contains a MAC of the other components of message 16 using the DH shared key,
the MD can check the authenticity of message 16, ensuring that the protocol has not
been hi-jacked. However, an attacker who can hi-jack the protocol at step 18 could
equally easily hi-jack it at step 1. This requires blocking the legitimate message PI
and replacing it as necessary with PI ′ so that the MD agrees a shared key with the
attacker instead of the shop and, later, the forged message 16 is authenticated by the
MD. Since TP is not known to the attacker until PI is transmitted, the attacker needs
to collect the legitimate PI first in order to include TP in PI ′, this being necessary
to obtain the customer’s agreement over the price. However, for this to succeed, the
attacker must prevent the correct PI from reaching the MD. Consequently, the success
of Diffie-Hellman key exchange between shop and MD cannot be prevented unless the
attacker can guess TP correctly or the customer fails to check the amount carefully.
An attacker may use a hidden camera which can read the shop’s till display, then his
NFC hi-jack device can know TP in advance and so determine a value for PI which
the customer will accept. He can therefore block the legitimate message 2 and replace
it with his own. The threat from this is similar to that of a camera capturing PIN
values. Payment Card Industry Security Standard Council (PCI SSC) prohibits use of
cameras near a PIN entering device to avoid monitoring of displays, PIN pads, etc., [8].
Moreover, there are two methods to block RF communication on the NFC link and
neither of the methods can easily be adopted in our scenario. The first is to cover the
transmitter or receiver with some shielding material. The other method is to produce
a high noise on the same operating frequency resulting in a significant decrease in the
signal-to-noise ratio. For the former the attacker must shield the MD or the shop
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terminal. The latter requires noise generating hardware in close proximity to the MD
and the shop sales terminal. Both approaches are visibly detectable. This means there
is little scope for a successful attack when the MD also verifies the authenticity of
message 16. It should therefore be an acceptably small risk.
AppID, which is sent in the clear over the NFC link, is a random string generated
by the credit approval authority. From an attacker’s perspective, its only significance
is its assurance that the customer had, at least before the transaction, the amount TP
in his account. This assurance can also be achieved if a customer successfully pays for
some goods. Therefore, AppID is not sensitive information in this scenario.
The Role of the Approval Identifier in message 16. AppID acts as a bridge
between phase II and III. It also adds freshness to message 16, so it cannot be replayed
in future. Any alteration in the Kinfo results in invalid keys and an invalid AppID.
Hence it is detectable.
Non-repudiation of Transaction Execution Messages. TEMu and TEMs are
digitally signed by the MTD. In case of any dispute over payment, the MTD has to
honour both messages. So, both the customer and the shop are completely assured of
the transaction payment taking place.
Disclosure of Relevant Information. The Crreq containing price information is
not disclosed to the base station or any other GSM entity apart from the MTD. The
SBAD is sensitive information. It is encrypted not only over the GSM links but also
over the NFC link. It is transmitted through the mobile device to the MTD, yet the
former cannot decrypt this information. The AccID of the customer is not disclosed
to the shop. The MNO does not need to know the shopping details of the customer.
Therefore, only the total amount is communicated to the MNO for transaction.
New Keys for every Transaction. The encryption and MAC keys for the message
Crreq, namely K1 and K2, are freshly generated by the mobile device in each round.
Similarly, the keys K3 and K4, generated by the shop, are fresh for each transaction.
Of course, these should not be predictable, especially if previous such keys become
known.
Encryption and MAC Keys. Separate keys are used for encryption and MAC
calculation making the protocol more secure. Encrypt-then-MAC is an approach where
the ciphertext is generated by encrypting the plaintext and then appending a MAC of
the encrypted plaintext. This approach is cryptographically more secure than other
approaches [15]. Apart from its cryptographic value, the MAC can be verified without
performing decryption. So, if the MAC is invalid for a message, the message is discarded
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without decryption. This results in computational efficiency.
6.5.4 Monetary Transaction Between Two Individuals
The proposed protocol can be used for monetary transactions between two individuals.
The payee acts as a shop PoS terminal, and can use his own mobile phone for this. The
added advantage in our proposal is that the payee does not need to register himself with
the payer’s (= customer’s) MNO to receive a payment. This eliminates dependency of
both parties to be on the same mobile network for monetary transactions. The payee
needs only to provide his banking details in step 16 of the protocol.
6.5.5 Comparison of Proposed and Conventional Framework
Our proposed model is a Card not Present (CNP) model. If we compare our model with
a conventional payment system described in 6.2.2, it is obvious that the MTD plays the
role of an acquirer in our framework. The main difference is in the authentication of
the user, which in our case is carried out through GSM network. In conventional CNP
models, only the visible card data such as card number, cardholder’s name, expiry date
are used to authenticate the user. CNP transactions are vulnerable to fraud as the
chip data cannot be verified [18]. In our model, we virtually linked a registered bank
card to a SIM card against a specific user. Now, the SIM card is also authenticated
along with the CNP verification. Like an acquirer, the MTD acts a third party between
the merchant and the card holder for monetary transfer. It also keeps a record of all
transactions for any future disputes.
The issuer in our model, for pay-as-you-go transactions, is the same as the issuer
in the conventional payment system, i.e., the financial entity that issues card to a card
holder. The MTD communicates with the issuer to debit the account of the card holder
and then credit the account of the shop. On the other hand, for pre-paid, the issuer is
subsumed by the MTD.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed another transaction protocol for providing a secure
and trusted communication channel for payment of goods using mobile devices. We
used a different approach from the earlier versions of this protocol. The main advantage
of this protocol over its earlier version is the elimination of a shared secret between
the shop and the MNO. This makes this protocol more flexible and can also be used
for monetary transactions between two individuals even though both use different mo-
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bile networks. We proposed a dedicated department, MNO Transaction Department
(MTD), responsible for all the transactions. The security features of our protocol pro-
vide virtual tunnels among the mobile device, shop PoS terminal and the MTD. This
caters for unsecured channels within various entities of the GSM network. The anal-
ysis shows the protocol is secure against various attacks by a dishonest customer or a
dishonest shop.
In the next chapter, we will shift our focus to light-weight (e.g., NFC Type-1 and
Type-2 tags) RFID tags. We will describe a mutual authentication protocol for light-





This is a joint work with Zeeshan Bilal and Keith Martin (ISG, RHUL).
My contribution in this work is the Full Disclosure Active(FDA) Attack on
SIDRFID (§ 7.4.2). Moreover, I also contributed in many fruitful discus-
sions that resulted in various other attacks mentioned in the chapter. This
work is published in the Journal of Applied Mathematics and Information
Sciences [17]. This chapter is almost verbatim of the published paper.
7.1 Introduction
We have, till now, covered the authentication issues related to NFC technology. Our
proposals for tag authentications (described in Chapter 4) deals with only high-cost
NFC tags that are able to perform public key cryptography. The light-weight NFC
tags, such as Type-1 or Type-2 tags described in §2.2 are unable to perform public
key cryptography. These tags require light-weight easily implementable authentication
mechanisms. NFC, being an extension to RFID technology, can incorporate RFID
authentication protocols. We selected an ultra-lightweight mutual authentication pro-
tocol for RFIDs proposed by Yung-Cheng Lee [43] that can also be used in NFC tags
and performed its security analysis. We discovered that the Lee’s protocol is vulnerable
to multiple attacks described §7.4 and §7.5 of this chapter.
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7.2 Authentication in RFIDs
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are becoming pervasive in large scale
identification applications [39]. The most widely deployed are low-cost RFID sys-
tems [23], where tags normally cost a few cents. These tags are likely to replace
bar-codes as the line of sight is not required making it more user-friendly. However,
there are many privacy and security concerns with low-cost RFID systems [39]. The
main limiting factor in low-cost RFID tags relates to lack of resources, such as memory,
computational power etc. RFID tags can be roughly classified into four classes based
on the available resources [23].
1. The full-fledged class refers to those RFID tags that have enough resources to
support conventional cryptographic functions like symmetric encryption, crypto-
graphic one-way function, or even the public key algorithms. NFC Forum Type
4 tags or the tags used in ePassport fall in this category.
2. The simple tags refers to those tags that have sufficient power to support simple
functions such as random number generator or one-way hashing function.
3. The third class called lightweight refers to those tags that can support simple
functions like Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) checksum, or a random number
generator but not a hash function.
4. The fourth class is ultralightweight referring to the tags that only support simple
bitwise operations (like XOR, AND, OR, etc).
Consequently, authentication schemes used in RFID tags also follow similar cate-
gorization. We focus on Low-cost RFID systems that fall in the ultra-lightweight class
of RFID tags. Yung-Cheng Lee proposed two ultra-lightweight authentication proto-
cols, SIDRFID and DIDRFID, for RFID tags [43]. In the SIDRFID, the tags and the
reader do not share any secrets, but rather use their respective identities as shared
secrets. These identities are, therefore, sensitive information so they are not transmit-
ted in clear. These identities are not updated and are static. Hence the protocol is
termed as “Ultra-lightweight RFID Protocol with Static Identity (SIDRFID)”. In the
DIDRFID, the tag and the reader share a secret key K. The K and the tag iden-
tity, IDT are updated in each authentication session. Therefore this protocol is called
“Ultra-lightweight RFID Protocol with Dynamic Identity (DIDRFID)”. Both proto-
cols claim to provide mutual authentication and implement very efficient and extremely
lightweight functions. We discuss these protocols in greater depth in Section 7.3.
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Avoine et al. have carried out a security analysis of both protocols [14]. They
observe that using a single master key in SIDRFID is a single point of failure if com-
promised. However, they do not elaborate on any specific technique to recover the
master key. We show in this paper how to recover this single master key and break the
entire SIDRFID system. Further, Avoine et al. highlight an attack on the secret key
used in DIDRFID. This attack involves eavesdropping two rounds of the authentication
session and L2 possible guesses (where L is the length of secret key K). We improve
this attack and demonstrate a passive full disclosure attack on the DIDRFID. Our at-




Our analysis is explained in detail in Section 7.4 and Section 7.5. We also describe
further attacks on these protocols including one where an attacker successfully traces
a tag.
7.3 Two Ultra-lightweight Authentication Protocols
In this section, we summarize the two authentication protocols proposed by Yung-
Cheng Lee for low-cost RFID systems [43]. These protocols belong to the ultra-
lightweight class and claim to provide mutual authentication. Additionally, these proto-
cols claim to resist attacks including traceability, replay, de-synchronization and imper-
sonation. Importantly, the computation cost is kept low by incorporating lightweight
functions. In the proposed protocols, the pseudo-random number generator is installed
only in the reader. The low-cost tag only performs simple bit-wise operations (XOR,
AND, OR) and bits rotation Rot(A,B), where Rot(A,B) represents left rotation of
string A by HW (B) bits.
7.3.1 Static Identity Protocol for RFID (SIDRFID)
The protocol assumes that tag and reader each have static identities IDT and IDR,
respectively, which are secret values shared by each entity (it is assumed that tag and
reader have these pre-installed prior to activation of the scheme). The IDR is also
stored in the tag which implies that this protocol can only be implemented in scenarios
where there is one particular reader or many readers with the same IDR. The protocol
executes as follows:
• Step 1.
– Reader generates R
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– Reader computes:
Si = R⊕ IDR
– Reader → Tag : S
• Step 2.
– Tag computes:
R = S ⊕ IDR
P = IDT ⊕Rot(R, IDR)
Q = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R,R)
– Tag → Reader : (P,Q)
• Step 3.
– Reader computes:
IDT = P ⊕Rot(R, IDR)
Q
′
= Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R,R))









– In case of successful tag authentication, the reader computes:
Z = Rot(IDT, IDR⊕R)⊕Rot(IDR, IDT ⊕R)
– Reader → Tag : Z
• Step 5.
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= Rot(IDT, IDR⊕R)⊕Rot(IDR, IDT ⊕R)








7.3.2 Dynamic Identity Protocol for RFID (DIDRFID)
The protocol assumes that tag and reader share a secret key K . This may be pre-
installed in the reader and in the tag prior to activation of the scheme. The dynamic ID
of the tag, DIDT , and the secret key K are updated after every authentication session.
We use DIDTi and Ki as the dynamic ID of the tag and the secret key respectively in
the ith authentication session. The protocol, in the ith session, executes as follows:
• Step 1.
– Tag → Reader : DIDTi
• Step 2.
– Reader uses DIDTi as index to extract the corresponding secret key Ki from
the database.
– Reader generates a random number Ri.
– Reader computes:
Ai = Ki ⊕Ri
Bi = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri)
– Reader → Tag : (Ai, Bi)
• Step 3.
110
7.3. Two Ultra-lightweight Authentication Protocols 7. Attacks on Authentication Protocols
– Tag computes:
Ri = Ai ⊕Ki
B
′
i = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri)
– Tag authenticates reader as follows:
if B
′






– In case of successful reader authentication, the tag computes:
Ci = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki)





i = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki)
– Reader authenticates tag as follows:
if C
′





• Key Updating Step. After successful mutual authentication, tag and reader
update their values:
– Tag and Reader compute:
DIDTi+1 = Rot(Ri, Ri ∨Ki)⊕Rot(Ki, Ri ∧Ki)
Ki+1 = Rot(Ri, Ri ∧Ki)⊕Rot(Ki, Ri ∨Ki)
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– Tag and Reader both keep (DIDTi,Ki) and (DIDTi+1,Ki+1) in their mem-
ory.
7.4 Security Analysis of SIDRFID
In this section, we carry out a security analysis of SIDRFID [43]. Avoine et al. have
suggested that SIDRFID is a weak protocol because it uses a single master key which
in many situations is considered unacceptable [14]. However, there may be applica-
tions, such as issuing temporary RFID tags for access control to a team visiting an
organization, where use of a single master key may be justified. In such scenarios, we
do not need to generate new keys on every access attempt and thus avoid the need
for secure distribution of these secret keys to each tag. Nonetheless we show that,
even in situations where a fixed master key is justified, the secret entities can be easily
recovered thus demonstrating that SIDRFID is a very weak protocol.
7.4.1 Passive Hamming Weight Disclosure (PHWD) Attack
We first present a passive attack which reveals HW(IDR). We make the realistic
assumption that the channel between the tag and the reader is wireless and insecure.
The attacker simply needs to eavesdrop any two authentication sessions. Moreover,
the resources available to the attacker are also limited so it cannot perform heavy
computations (a realistic assumption in lightweight cryptography). The attack executes
as follows:
• Step 1. Attacker eavesdrops two legitimate authentication sessions to obtain
S1, P1 and S2, P2.
• Step 2. The attacker computes A and B as follows:
A = S1 ⊕ S2
= (R1 ⊕ IDR)⊕ (R2 ⊕ IDR)
= R1 ⊕R2
(7.1)
B = P1 ⊕ P2
= (IDT ⊕Rot(R1, IDR))⊕ (IDT ⊕Rot(R2, IDR))
= Rot(R1, IDR)⊕Rot(R2, IDR)
= Rot(R1 ⊕R2, IDR)
(7.2)
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From (7.1) and (7.2), we get:
B = Rot(A, IDR) (7.3)
Since A and B are known from (7.1) and (7.2), HW (IDR) can easily be obtained
from (7.3).
After disclosing HW (IDR), an attacker can carry out a selective brute force attack
to find the exact value, where each value has correctness probability (considering L as






This value is much higher than 2−L, which is the probability of brute force attack
success against an L-bit value. If we assume IDR to be similar to those assigned
as EPC values (96-bits [5]), then the IDR consists of only 36 unknown bits (which
we denote IDR∗) and the remaining 60 bits are publicly known (these determine the
header, manufacturer and type of item details). This further raises the correctness






The denominator’s maximum value reaches to 233 corresponding to HW (IDR∗) = 18.
As HW (IDR∗) is already obtained from Eq (7.3), an attacker needs 233 attempts, at
maximum, to recover the key which is substantially fewer trials to conduct.
7.4.2 Full Disclosure Active (FDA) Attack
We now present a Full Disclosure Active (FDA) attack against SIDRFID. We assume
that either the attacker is in possession of the tag or there is no restriction on accessing
the tag. This attack involves eavesdropping one authentication session and sending
L− 1 chosen public messages to the tag, where L is the length of bit string IDR. The
FDA attack is explained as follows:
• Step 1. The attacker eavesdrops a legitimate authentication session and records
S1, P1, Q1 and Z1 (described in Section 7.3.1), where the labels of individual bits
in each of these strings is as for the string X in the List of Notation.
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• Step 2. The attacker impersonates a legitimate reader and sends S2, a manip-





subscript of S represents the authentication session and subscript of s represents
the bit position).
• Step 3. Tag computes R2 as follows:
R2 = S2 ⊕ IDR (7.4)
Since IDR is fixed, R2 is the same as R1 except that the least significant two





R1 = rL−1 · · · r2r1r0
R2 = rL−1 · · · r2r′1r
′
0
Let M = R1 ⊕R2
= 00 · · · 011
(7.5)
Tag now computes P2 and Q2 where,
P2 = IDT ⊕Rot(R2, IDR)
Q2 = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R2, R2)
and sends them to the attacker.
• Step 4. After receiving P2 and Q2, the attacker computes N as:
N = P1 ⊕ P2
= (IDT ⊕Rot(R1, IDR))⊕ (IDT ⊕Rot(R2, IDR))
= Rot(R1, IDR)⊕Rot(R2, IDR)
= Rot(R1 ⊕R2, IDR)
N = Rot(M, IDR)
(7.6)
Since N and M are known in (7.6), HW(IDR) can be calculated.
• Step 5. The attacker now computes T as:
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T = Q1 ⊕Q2
= (Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R1, R1))⊕ (Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R2, R2))
= Rot(R1, R1)⊕Rot(R2, R2)
(7.7)
• Step 6. R2 is same as R1 except that the least two bits are flipped as r′0 and
r
′
1, as explained before for deriving (7.5). The two least significant bits of R1,
will either be the same or different with probability one half. The attacker thus
analyses (7.7) according to two conditions as follows:
1. Case 1. The two flipped bits of R1 are different, which results in:
HW (R1) = HW (R2)
This simplifies (7.7) as follows:
T = Rot(R1 ⊕R2, R1)
= Rot(M,R1)
(7.8)
Since M is a string of all 0’s except for two consecutive 1’s in the least sig-
nificant positions (as described for (7.5)), T will also consist of all 0’s except
for two consecutive 1’s in the string. The position of the first 1 starting with
the least significant bit as zero determines HW(R1). The attacker marks the
least significant bit of R1 as x and the next bit as x
′
(in this case the first
two LSBs are inverses of each other).
2. Case 2. The two flipped bits of R1 are the same which results in either:
HW (R1) = HW (R2) + 2
or
HW (R1) = HW (R2)− 2
Since HW(R1) 6= HW(R2), this does not simplify (7.7). In this case the
string T will be a random string of 0’s and 1’s without any pattern. The
attacker marks the least significant bit of R1 as x and the next bit as x,
since both bits are either 0 or 1.
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• Step 7. The attacker continues sending the next chosen plaintext S3 by flipping
(s0, s2). The resultant string T in this case will reveal whether r2 is the same as
r0.






In general, the attacker continues sending chosen plaintexts by flipping two bits
(s0, sk) where k = 1 · · · (L − 1) as shown in Figure 7.1. For every kth authentic-
ation session, the string T in (7.7) reveals two bits of R1, (r0, rk), to be either
the same or otherwise.
• Step 8. At the end of this attack, R1 is represented as a string of x and x′ with
known HW(R1) from (7.8). The attacker now replaces x’s with 1’s and x
′
’s with
0’s, or vice versa according to HW(R1).
• Step 9. The only non-trivial value will be when HW(R1) = L/2. In this case,
x can either be 1 or 0. Thus, R1 has two possible values. The attacker uses the
eavesdropped legitimate round of Step 1 and checks which of the two possible
values of R1 satisfies the values of the public messages S1, P1 and Q1.
• Step 10. Once we get the value of R1, we can easily determine IDR and IDT
from any of the public messages. It now becomes very easy to launch multiple
attacks on a tag including tag cloning, tag tracking and inventorying [39].
7.4.3 Other Attacks
We have just shown a full disclosure attack which completely disrupts the authentic-
ation process in SIDRFID. We now highlight further weaknesses in the design of this
protocol which can be exploited to launch multiple attacks.
Traceability Attack
We assume that a low-cost RFID tag is unable to keep track of the current status in
an authentication round. It thus replies to every query sent by a compatible reader.
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Figure 7.1: Full Disclosure Active (FDA) Attack in SIDRFID (for L=96).
In SIDRFID, the public messages P and Q are different in every authentication ses-
sion because of the different random R’s generated by the reader. The attacker thus
eavesdrops one round of authentication and keeps on sending the same S, thus forcing
the tag to calculate similar public messages. This will facilitate tracking of a particular
tag.
Reader Impersonation
The order of authentication is important in RFID authentication protocols and can
counter several active attacks. The reader should be authenticated first so the tag
may transmit its secret information only to a legitimate reader. The wrong order
of authentication leads to a reader impersonation attack. An attacker can eavesdrop
a legitimate authentication round. The attacker can then impersonate a legitimate
reader and replay the eavesdropped response as legitimate and get itself authenticated.
This attack is possible because secret values are not updated in each fresh round of
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authentication.
Identification of Reader
SIDRFID does not specify how the tag determines which IDR is to be used to generate
the public values. Therefore, a further limitation of this protocol is that it can only
be implemented in scenarios where there is only one particular reader or many readers
with the same IDR.
7.5 Security Analysis of DIDRFID
In this section, we carry out a security analysis of DIDRFID [43]. Avoine et al. pre-
sented a key guessing attack against DIDRFID [14]. This attack requires eavesdropping
two authentication session and a total of L2 possible guesses, where L is the length
of the secret key. Whilst this is a serious attack, we present another variant of full
disclosure attack which uniquely determines the key in many fewer attempts. This
further demonstrates that DIDRFID is a very weak protocol.
7.5.1 Passive Weight Disclosure (PWD) Attack
We assume that the channel between the tag and reader is wireless and insecure. The
PWD attack first obtains HW(K) which then allows us to uniquely determine the
correct secret K.
The details of this protocol are given in § 7.3.2 and our attack, which extracts the
secret key K, is as follows:
• Step 1. Attacker scans the communication channel until he observes that the
message Bi in (7.9) sent by reader to tag (forward channel) is same as the message
Ci in (7.10) sent by tag to reader (backward channel).
Bi = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri) (7.9)
Ci = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki) (7.10)
It is evident from (7.9) and (7.10) that Bi = Ci when:
HW (Ki) = HW (Ri) (7.11)
The probability P of meeting this condition for two random L bits values is:
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We use an approximation of Eq 7.12 using Vandermonde convolution formula
(also called ChuVandermonde formula) [32, 66] and Stirling’s approximation [28].



























So, we say that the attacker needs to observe
√
piL authentication sessions (on
average) to find the message B sent by the reader equal to the message C sent
by the tag. For L = 96 (assuming that the scheme is following EPC standard),
the attacker eavesdrops only 18 sessions of authentication, on average, to get the
required outcome.
• Step 3. Once the condition in Eq (7.11) is satisfied, attacker re-writes (7.9)
and (7.10) as follows:
Bi = Rot(Ki ⊕Ri,Ki), (7.16)
Ci = Rot(Ki ⊕Ri,Ki) (7.17)
• Step 4. Since message A is:
Ai = Ki ⊕Ri. (7.18)
as described in Section 7.3.2, (7.16) and (7.17) can be written as:
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Bi = Ci = Rot(Ai,Ki). (7.19)
Since Ai, Bi and Ci are known, HW(Ki) can be computed from (7.19) which will
be the same as HW(Ri) according to (7.11).
• Step 5. Since Ai, HW(Ki) and HW(Ri) are known, the attacker uses (7.18)
to determine j (the number of 1’s in Ki overlapping with Ri at the same bit
positions). The value of j is computed as follows:
j = HW (Ki)− 1
2
HW (Ai) (7.20)
• Step 6. The value of j from (7.20) is used to determine HW (Ri ∨ Ki) and
HW (Ri ∧Ki) as follows:
HW (Ri ∨Ki) = HW (Ai) + j (7.21)
HW (Ri ∧Ki) = j (7.22)
• Step 7. The attacker now XORs the update equations given in Section 7.3.2 as
follows:
DIDTi+1 ⊕Ki+1 = Rot(Ri ⊕Ki, Ri ∨Ki)⊕Rot(Ri ⊕Ki, Ri ∧Ki)
= Rot(Ai, Ri ∧Ki)⊕Rot(Ai, Ri ∨Ki)
(7.23)
DIDi+1 is transmitted in the next authentication session, where Ai, HW(Ri ∨
Ki) and HW (Ri ∧Ki) are already known. So Ki+1 can be easily and uniquely
calculated from the above equation.
7.5.2 Comparison between Our Attack and Avoine’s Attack
The complexity of revealing the secret K for both attacks depends on the number
of bits of secret K. The number of operations in Avoine’s attack corresponds to the
number of guesses before revealing the correct K. Avoine’s attack thus requires a total
of L2 guesses and eavesdropping of two sessions of the DIDRFID protocol.
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Our attack requires a small number of authentication sessions (
√
piL) as mentioned
in Eq 7.15 to be eavesdropped, but once this is done there is no further “guesswork”
required since the key K is uniquely revealed.
We note that for the case of EPCglobal tag, L = 96 and hence the attacker needs to
eavesdrop 18 authentication sessions, on average. Since eavesdropping the tag-reader
channel is easy, our attack can be very effective in dense reader environments where
tags can be read multiple times. The relationship between our attack and Avoine attack
is summarized in Table 7.1.
Type No of rounds No of guesses
of to be before
Attack eavesdropped revealing secret key
Avoine Attack 2 L2
Our Attack
√
piL (on average) 1
Table 7.1: Comparison between our attack and Avoine attack.
7.5.3 Traceability Attack
We note an additional weakness of the DIDRFID protocol. If the final message Ci
sent by the tag does not reach the reader due to a transmission error, or the attacker
disrupts it, the reader does not recognize the updated value DIDTi+1. The reader
in this case asks for older values of DIDTi (this is not mentioned in [43]). In such
a scenario, the attacker can track the tag by eavesdropping DIDTi, Ai, Bi and then
disrupting message Ci. The attacker can then repeatedly ask for an older value DIDTi
and send Ai, Bi in response, thus tracking the tag.
7.6 Conclusion
We have carried out security analysis of the two ultra-lightweight RFID authentication
protocols, SIDRFID and DIDRFID, proposed by Yung-Cheng Lee [43]. Earlier analysis
carried out by Avoine et al. [14] on SIDRFID mentions that the use of single master
key is a potential weakness but does not describe the method to recover the master
key. We have shown how to recover this single master key, thus allowing this weakness
to be fully exploited. The attack on DIDRFID presented by Avoine et al. determines
the correct key in L2 attempts (where L is the length of key). We presented a full
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disclosure attack by reducing the number of attempts to
√
piL. We conclude that both




The integration of NFC with cellular technology has given a new dimension to the usage
of NFC. It has a vast applications ranging from simple contents sharing to complex
processes like m-commerce. NFC will be, most likely, the key technology that will be
used in the mobile transaction in the coming years. In this context, the security of
NFC is of crucial importance in success of NFC.
We focused on the security issues of NFC and RFID, mainly authentication. NFC
and RFID tags are generally displayed in public with open access to any reader. For
instance, smart posters that are used for advertisement purpose contain data that is
accessible to any reader. The authentication of tag’s contents is then becomes crucially
important.
Similarly, there are occasions where copying the contents of an NFC tag to another
tag is undesirable. For instance, an NFC tag used for access control, or an NFC tag
registered against a specific product. In such cases, the authentication of the tag itself
is very important.
Following the same approach, our contribution is subdivided into two main cate-
gories; Tag Data Authentication and Tag Authentication. The contributions are as
follows:
1. NFC Forum released the Signature Specification in 2010 to digitally sign the
tag’s contents. The signature is computed over the Type, ID and Payload fields
of an NDEF record, whereas the lengths fields and the NDEF header byte remain
unsigned. The partial signing of NDEF message leads to multiple attacks such
as Record Composition / Decomposition attack. These attacks exploit unsigned
fields in the NDEF header. The earlier published attacks were not fully imple-
mentable as the required changes in the lengths fields were not taken into account.
We refined these attacks and explained precisely what additional changes need
123
8. Conclusion
to be done. After refining the attacks, we provided two countermeasures to avoid
such attacks.
The first countermeasure suggests for the inclusion of TNF, Type-Length, Payload-
Length and ID-Length in the signature in such a way that the properties of an
NDEF message, e.g., record chunking, remain intact. This requires a revision in
the signature RTD only, without any alteration in the NDEF specification [63].
The second countermeasure is based on the removal of the data redundancy in
the NDEF specification. Two bytes consisting of the Type-length and ID-Length
fields are alway zero for the middle and terminating chunk records (TNF=6).
Hence, this is a redundant data as the TNF value in the header byte indicates
the same. We suggested that removal of the lengths fields from the middle and
terminating chunks (as these fields are always zero for chunk records) can fix
some of the issues regarding signature specification [62].
We drew attention to our work by writing to the NFC Forum regarding the attacks
and the proposed countermeasures. Consequently, the NFC Forum released a
candidate specification for the updated Signature RTD Version 2.0 in 2013.
2. Presently, there is no mechanism provided by the NFC Forum to detect a coun-
terfeit or cloned tag. This results in various possibilities for malicious activities
where a legitimate tag is replaced by a counterfeit tag and the NFC tag reader
is unable to detect the counterfeit. We proposed a framework to counter such
attacks by providing a tag authenticating mechanism [64]. We introduced a new
Tag Authentication Record that provides relevant information to authenticate a
tag in an off-line environment. It employs public key cryptography with digital
certificates and so can be used on NFC tags that have sufficient computational
power and resources to perform such operations. The Tag Authentication Record
is based on the NFC Data Exchange Format and is thus compatible with all
NFC Forum devices. The NFC tag simply signs a challenge c and returns the
signature to the NFC reader. The NFC reader verifies the signature according
to the information available in the previously communicated Tag Authentication
record. A successful verification confirms that the tag is not cloned. Of course,
the certificate chain should also be checked for any revocation.
Since the proposed specification requires public key encryption to be performed
by the tag, the specification may be implementable to a small number of tags, at
present, that have sufficient resources and power to perform public key crypto-
graphy. The scheme may be applied to more number of tags in future as their
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computational power increases over time. Moreover, light-weight versions of pub-
lic key encryption schemes may also appear and allow wider applicability.
3. After proposing a mechanism to authenticate a tag, we proposed a framework to
demonstrate its use in a supply chain to detect counterfeit tags [61]. We proposed
that if the products are equipped with NFC tags, the counterfeit products can
be identified by authenticating the attached NFC tags. During the initialisation
phase, the product specifications like serial number, model, manufacturer, expiry
date etc., are stored in the NFC tag along with the public key Kpub in the earlier
proposed Tag Authentication Record. The data is signed according to the NFC
Forum signature specification. An application in the user’s cell phone reads the
NFC tag’s contents and detects the Tag Authentication record in the NDEF mes-
sage stored in the tag. The user’s phone executes a challenge response protocol
to ascertain whether the tag has a correct private key Kpr (corresponding to the
Kpub). A counterfeit product can be detected as it lacks the correct private key.
We analyzed the economic aspects of the proposed scheme at a broader level as
the inclusion of NFC tags require some additional investment by the supplier.
Our analysis shows that the scheme is suitable for products with $30 or more
profit margin (assuming 7% counterfeits in the market and $2/unit is the cost
implementing NFC tag in a product).
4. Keeping in view that the main use of NFC in future will be commercial, we pro-
posed a mobile payment solution [60]. The proposal is based on a cloud wallet
model, where only the authentication credentials are stored in the mobile device
and all sensitive information is stores in a cloud. Our protocol can be sued for the
monetary transfer between two individuals who may not share the same mobile
network. A customer, who wants to pay for some goods or services, is first authen-
ticated by his MNO and after successful authentication, the amount is transferred
to the shop account. We proposed a dedicated department, MNO Transaction
Department (MTD), responsible for all the transactions. The security features of
our protocol provide virtual tunnels among the mobile device, shop PoS terminal
and the MTD. This caters for unsecured channels within various entities of the
GSM network. The analysis shows the protocol is secure against various attacks
by a dishonest customer or a dishonest shop.
5. I participated in the security analysis of two ultra-lightweight mutual authentic-
ation protocols, SIDRFID and DIDRFID [17]. The former is based on a static
identity of RFID whereas the latter is based on dynamic identity of RFID. I con-
tributed in a Full Disclosure Active (FDA) attack against SIDRFID. This is a
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chosen plaintext attack where the attacker sends L−1 chosen public messages to
the tag (L represents the length of the secret static tag ID). the chosen messages
are designed in such a way that results in full disclosure of the secret.
8.1 Future of NFC
NFC can be used in variety of applications like identification, automation, ticketing,
content sharing, payment, advertisement etc. In spite of its potential, standardised
architectures are yet to develop to cater for its vast area of applications. Since NFC
will be, most likely, used for m-commerce, the security is the back-bone of the NFC.
Security issues emerging as a result of a sharp increase in its utility are a constant
threat to the stability of an NFC ecosystem.
In addition to technical matters, there are concerns such as personalization, data
storage, management and ownership of the Secure Element (SE) as it stores sensitive
data such as banking credentials. Various key players in an NFC ecosystem, like mobile
phone developers, financial institutions, smart card manufacturers, MNOs, operating
system developers etc., are required to develop a widely acceptable NFC ecosystem.
They need to improve their products in terms of compatibility and security. NFC,
being a relatively new technology, is yet to mature to be widely used in m-commerce.
In a nutshell, the NFC would become a widely implemented main-stream technology
provided that the NFC stake holders improve their products and standards to pull the
NFC out of its current state of the Trough of Disillusionment. According to technical
experts, this may take a time period of about two to five years.
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Sony Xperia M2 Sony Xperia P
Sony Xperia S Sony Xperia Sola
Sony Xperia SP Sony Xperia T
Sony Xperia T2 Ultra Sony Xperia Tablet Z
Sony Xperia V Sony Xperia VL
Sony Xperia Z Sony Xperia Z1
Sony Xperia Z1 Compact Sony Xperia Z2
Sony Xperia Z2 Tablet7 Sony Xperia ZL
Sony Xperia ZR TazTag TazPad7
TazTag TPH-One7 The Toughphone Defender
Toughshield R-500 Toughshield T700
Turkcell MaxiPRO5 Turkcell T11/ZTE Racer II
Turkcell T40 Umi Cross
Umi X2S Vertu Constellation
Vertu Ti Vodafone Smart III
Xiaomi Mi 2A7 Xiaomi Mi3
Xolo X900 Yota Devices YotaPhone (2014)7
Yulong Coolpad 8870 NFC7 Zopo ZP998
ZTE Blade II ZTE GoTa GH800
ZTE Grand X IN ZTE Kis
ZTE Nubia Z5 ZTE Orbit
ZTE PF200 ZTE R233
ZTE Turkcell MaxiPLUS5
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